Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 18 | Number 1

Article 1

1-1-1978

An Analysis of the Impact of the Federal Election
Campaign Act on the 1976 Democratic
Presidential Primary
David Ifshin

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
David Ifshin, An Analysis of the Impact of the Federal Election Campaign Act on the 1976 Democratic Presidential Primary, 18 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 1 (1978).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE
FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT ON THE
1976 DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY
David Ifshin*

"And so, as 1976 approached. . . [t]he prospect was
for chaos; a chaos compounded by the new campaignfinance law-untested, its provisions not well understood
by an electorate that had in any case apparently tuned out,
its effect uncertain,its meaning uncleareven among scholars who examined it and politicians who tried to make the
most of it or, at the very least, to survive'under it."
Jules Witcoverl
"The 1976 Presidentialelection proved that the concept of public financing works, and that it works for both
primaries and general elections. Now, the time has come
to extend this basic reform of the political process for the
Senate and House of Representatives."
2
Senator Richard Clark (D-Iowa)
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INTRODUCTION

The history of political campaign reform in this country
prior to 1971 had been dismal. The sporadic attempts to curb
some of the more blatant excesses and abuses had been ineffective.' Although the spectacular revelation of corrupt activities
to
in the 1972 elections pushed the issue of campaign reform
comprehensive
the center of national attention, the need for a
overhaul of the electoral system had been perceived by many
commentators long before. In 1962 the President's Commission
on Campaign Costs reported that "[n]o problem . . . has beficome more troublesome than that of providing adequate
nancial support for campaigns."' The Commission noted the
chronic "lurking suspicion that contributing to political parties
5
is somehow a shoddy business."
The core of the problem was the use of money in political
activities. Herbert Alexander, the leading commentator in the
field of political reform, estimated that in 1972 over $400 million was spent on federal elections.' Despite the staggering size
of this figure, the source and use of these funds was shrouded
in a cloak of secrecy that was only removed through a series of
fortuitous events and even then, not until after the election.!
of
Suspicions about the influence of these unknown sources
nation's
the
which
funds cast doubt on the processes through
political leaders and lawmakers are chosen.
Even before the Watergate scandal, Congress had moved
to reform federal campaign practices. In 1971 Congress passed
two major enactments: the Federal Election Campaign 9Act of
19718 and the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act. They
McCARTHY,
3. H. ALEXANDER, REGULATION OF POLITICAL FINANCE 3-6 (1966); M.
(1972).
SALE
FOR
ELECTIONS
4.

U.S.

CAMPAIGNS

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN

COSTS, FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL

2 (1962).

5. Id.
6. H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1972 ELECTION (1973).
7. PresidentialCampaign Activities of 1972: Hearings Before the Select Comm.
D. ADAMANY &
on PresidentialCampaigns, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See generally
IN AMERICA (1975);
AGEE, POLmCAL MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCING
PYNN, WATERGATE AND THE AMERIR.
(1975);
NIXON
M.
RICHARD
v.
U.S.
MANKIEWICZ,
F.
ITS EFCTS ON THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS (1975); D. SAFFELL, WATERGATE AND

G.

and
CAN POLmCAL SYSTEM (1974); Ervin, Campaign Practicesand the Law: Watergate

Beyond, 23 EMORY L.J. 1 (1974).
3 (codi8. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 1976).
1974,
(amended
1972)
II
(Supp.
U.S.C.
47
18,
2,
of
sections
fied in scattered
9. Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§ 801-802, 85
Stat. 497 (1971) (codified in I.R.C. §§ 6096, 9001-9013) (amended 1974, 1976).
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were the first significant reforms of campaign practices in almost fifty years.'"
Before these changes were put into practice in a presidential election," however, Congress substantially revised them
when it passed the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.12 These amendments instituted far reaching
changes in the process by which federal officials were elected,
particularly the president and vice-president of the United
States. As a result, the 1976 presidential election operated
under revised rules and procedures dramatically different from
those that had previously governed the electoral system. Moreover, during the course of the campaign the Supreme Court, in
response to a challenge to the Campaign Act,' handed down
its most comprehensive decision on governmental power to regulate the political process.' 4 Following the Court's decision declaring parts of the Campaign Act unconstitutional, Congress
amended the law in the middle of the campaign, enacting the
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976.'1 Additionally, after the 1976 experience under the Campaign Act,
legislation was introduced in Congress to extend the systems of
public financing to House and Senate campaigns.'
This article considers the impact of these unprecedented
10. The last major federal campaign reform legislation prior to 1971 was the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. I1, 43 Stat. 1070 (codified in
scattered sections of 2, 18, U.S.C. (1970)) (repealed 1972).
11. The disclosure and reporting requirements of the 1971 Act were effective after'
April 7, 1972 and applied to both presidential and congressional campaigns held that
year. The April 7th effective date rendered the law largely irlpotent. See text accompanying notes 34-37 infra. The 1971 Act did govern the 1974 congressional elections. Since
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) had yet to be established, reports for House
races were filed with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and reports for Senate
campaigns were filed with the Secretary of the Senate. The subsequent creation of the
FEC did not remove the requirement that reports be filed with these officers, thus
establishing a dual point of entry into the supervisory mechanism.
12. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
88 Stat. 1263 (amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225,
86 Stat. 3 (1972)) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47 U.S.C. (Supp. V
1975) (amended 1976).
13. The designation "Campaign Act" refers collectively to those campaign financing acts in force during the relevant time period under discussion. They include
the following: the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, its 1974 and 1976 amendments, and the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act.
14. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
15. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,
90, Stat. 475 (amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225,
86 Stat. 3 (1972)) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, U.S.C.A. (West Cum. Supp.
1977)).
16. See S.15, S.105, S.926, H.R.2610, H.R.5158-61, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. (1977).
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changes in the election laws on the 1976 Democratic presidential primary campaigns, particularly on managerial decisions.
In exploring the practical effects of this new area of federal
regulation, this article considers its strengths and weaknesses
and offers proposals for further amendments or extensions
of the election laws.
Part One of the article examines the various congressional
election laws, and the response of the Supreme Court on their
constitutionality. 7 Part Two looks at the administration of the
law by the newly established Federal Election Commission
(FEC) and the burdens compliance with its detailed reporting
requirements placed on campaigns. Part Three analyzes the
changes in strategy formulation candidates for president must
make under the new law. Specifically considered are: the timing of entry into the race, the screening effect of the crucial
"seed money" stage, and the ability of a candidate to raise
enough money to remain in the race throughout a long primary
period. Part Four examines the impact of the reduction of
available campaign funds on the allocation of campaign resources. Finally, Part Five analyzes the effect of the Campaign
Act on activities conducted independent of campaigns.
PART ONE: THE STATUTORY ENACTMENTS AND THE SUPREME
COURT RESPONSE

In order to appreciate the impact of the federal election
laws, it is essential to examine their regulatory framework as
enacted by Congress and refined by the Supreme Court. The
Campaign Act embodies four congressional enactments: (1) the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (hereinafter 1971 Act);
(2) the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act; (3) the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974; and (4) the
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976. Portions
of each reform survive, with the 1976 amendments correcting
the unconstitutional elements of the earlier proposals.
The 1971 Enactments
The Federal Election CampaignAct of 1971. This act was
composed of four titles." Title I required the broadcast media
17. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
18. See Statutory Comments, Undisclosed Earmarking: Violation of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, 10 HARV. J. LEO. 175 (1973); Berry & Goldman,
Congress and Public Policy: A Study of the FederalElection Campaign Act of 1971,
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to make advertising time available to candidates for federal
office at the station's lowest unit rate within specified periods
prior to primary and general elections."9 It also established
overall spending limits on the use of the communications
media.20 Title II amended earlier campaign laws which had
proved ineffective in regulating individual contribution limits,
use of a candidate's personal funds, and use of corporate and
union funds. It further redefined certain terms used in earlier
laws. 2 Subsequent amendments of the 1971 Act, discussed
below, caused much of Title II to be stillborn.
Title III constituted the heart of the 1971 Act. It provided
for compulsory disclosure of a candidate's financial information in an official report.22 In the pre-Watergate era, commentators on campaign practices had urged disclosures as the vital
reform. 3 Without disclosure, enforcement of any other element
of campaign regulatory law becomes exceedingly difficult and
its absence contributed to the failure of earlier reform efforts.
Title III required that "political committees""4 be formed for
the receipt and disbursement of campaign funds by candidates
for federal office, and that the committees designate a chairman and treasurer. The officers of the committee were required
10 HAJ.v. J. LEG. 331 (1973).

19. 47 U.S.C. §§ 312, 315, 802 (Supp. 11 1972) (§ 315 amended 1974, § 802
repealed 1974); see Wick, The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and Political
Broadcast Reform, 22 DEPAUL L. REv. 582, 591-92 (1973). For an examination of
abuses of the media in presidential elections, see J. McGINNISS, THE SELLING OF THE
PRESIDENT 1968 (1969).
20. 47 U.S.C. §§ 315, 803 (Supp. II 1972) (§315 amended 1974; § 803 repealed
1974); see Note, Campaign Finance Reforms: Pollution Control for the Smoke-Filled
Rooms, 23 CasE WESTERN RES. L. REv. 631, 655-58 (1972).

21. 18 U.S.C. §§ 591, 600, 610, 611 (Supp. H11972) (§ 591 amended 1974; § 600
amended 1976; §§ 610, 611 repealed 1976).
22. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-441 (Supp. H 1972) (§§ 431-439 amended 1974; §§ 431, 432,
434, 436, 438 amended 1976; § 440 repealed 1974; § 441 repealed 1976).
23. See, e.g., A. HEARD, THE CosTs OF DEMOCRAcY 462-71 (1960); see Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HAev. L. REv. 1111, 1239-46 (1975). See also CAMPAIGN PRAcs. REPS., Dec. 12, 1977, at 6-8.
24. "Political committees" were defined as "any committee, association, or
organization which accepts contributions or makes expenditures during a calendar
year in an aggregate amount exceeding $1000." See 2 U.S.C. § 431 (Supp. 11 1972)
(amended 1974, 1976). "Contribution" and "expenditure" are defined to essentially
include transfers of money or its equivalent:
for the purpose of influencing the result of a primary held for the selection
of delegates to a national nominating convention of a political party or
for the expression of a preference for the nomination of persons f or election to the office of President, or for the purpose of influencing the election of delegates to a constitutional convention for proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
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7

5
periodic
to register with a "supervisory officer" and to file
6 The 1971
reports disclosing specific financial information.
Act's final title contained certain general provisions, the most
significant of which repealed the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act.27
PresidentialElection Campaign Fund Act. A subsidy for
presidential candidates was first enacted into law by Congress
when it adopted a proposal offered by Senator Russell Long (DLa.) in 1966.28 Although later repealed, it established the
2
framework for the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act
(hereinafter Tax Checkoff). The Tax Checkoff permitted taxpayers to earmark one dollar on their returns (two dollars on
joint returns) for the Presidential Election Campaign Fund.?'
Candidates of "major parties"'" were eligible to receive subsidies for use in the general election, up to a sum equal to fifteen
cents for each eligible voter in the United States on June 1 of

32
the presidential election. Nominees of
the year prior ' to
3
3
"minor parties
were to receive a proportionately similar

25. Id. § 431g. The Clerk of the House of Representatives was designated to receive reports of candidates for House of Representative seats and political committees
seeking to influence House races; the Secretary of the Senate was designated to receive reports of senatorial candidates and committees seeking to influence Senate
races; and the comptroller general was designated to receive reports from presidential
candidates and other committees.
26. Id. § 434(b)(1)-(13) (amended 1974, 1976).
27. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. II, 43 Stat. 1070 (codified
in scattered sections of 2, 18, U.S.C. (1970)) (repealed 1972).
28. Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Pub. L. No. 89-809, §§ 303-305,
13180 Stat. 1539 (1966) (repealed 1971). See D. ADANY & G. AGEE, supra note 7, at
34; Note, supra note 20, 647 n.68.
29. Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§ 801-802,
85 Stat. 497 (1971) (codified in I.R.C. §§ 6096, 9001-9013) (amended 1974, 1976).
the
30. I.R.C. § 6096(a). All payments to campaigns both in the primary and
made
be
to
were
parties
political
of
committees
national
to
as
general elections as well
from this fund. Should the fund be inadequate, pro rats reductions were to be made.

Id. § 9006.

31. Id. § 9002(6). "Major party" was defined by this section as a "political party
rewhose candidate for the office of President in the preceding presidential election
of
ceived, as the candidate of such party, 25 percent or more of the total number
Id.
office."
such
for
candidates
all
by
received
votes
popular
32. Id. § 9004(a)(1). The method of disbursement of funds to candidates was
in the 1976 elections.
discarded before the reforms were employed for the first time
See notes 66-77 and accompanying text infra.
political party whose
33. I.R.C. § 9002(7). "Minor party" was defined as "a
election received,
presidential
preceding
the
in
candidates for the office of President
percent of the total
as the candidate of such party, 5 percent or more but less than 25
office." Id.
number of popular votes received by all candidates for such
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amount based on the number of votes received by their candidates in the last presidential election.34

The 1971 enactments and the 1972 election. The repeal of
the Long Plan and its replacement by the Tax Checkoff delayed the implementation of public subsidies until after the
1972 elections. Similarly, the 1971 Act did not take effect until
April 7, 1972, which substantially limited its effect on the elections held that year. Although many candidates voluntarily
disclosed the identity of their contributors, others refused on
the ground that there had been an understanding of confidentiality between the campaign and the funding source which
could not be unilaterally breached. 31 The subsequent revelations that the April 7 effective date had been the cover for early
unethical and illegal fundraising tactics contributed to renewed pressures for comprehensive reform of the campaign finance system.3 7 The result was the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1974.
34. Id. § 9004(a)(2). Tax credits and deductions for political contributions were
also enacted. See Revenue Act of 1971, §§ 701-702, I.R.C. §§ 41, 218, 219, 642
(amended 1974, 1976).
35. S. REP. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. 4-5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5587, 5588 [hereinafter cited without parallel citation as
SENATE
REPORT].

36. In testimony before the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, the head of the Finance Committee of the Committee to Re-Elect the President,
Maurice Stans, outlined this rationale: "[W]ith respect to people who contributed
before April 7 there were two parties in interest: there was our committee and there
was the contributor. Our committee did not care whether those names were disclosed
or not, but we felt that we did not have the right to waive the contributor's privacy."
Hearings before the Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities of the US.
Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st Seas. 754 (1973). In a subsequent commentary on the Watergate scandals, the director of Senator McGovern's campaign for the presidency in 1972
offered another view of the Committee to Re-Elect the President's refusal to disclose
the names of its contributors:
[T]he Corrupt Practices Act, passed in 1925, had always forbidden corporate contributions to a campaign. When Maurice Stans and Herbert
Kalmbach and the other Nixon fund-raisers were out talking to corporate
executives about the advantages that would flow to their companies from
"four more years," they were not confused by any late change in
the law;
they knew corporate contributions were illegal even as they were being
solicited.
F. MANKIEWIcZ, supra note 7, at 157; cf. CAMPAIGN PRics. REPs., Dec. 12, 1977, at 6-7
(disclosure potentially hurts challengers by leaving their contributors open to "incumbent's vengeance").
37. See Fleishman, The 1974 FederalElection CampaignAct Amendments: The
Shortcomings of Good Intentions, 1975 DUKE L.J. 851, 852 (1975). See also SENATE
REPORT, supra note 35; Comment, The Economics of the 1974 FederalElection Campaign Act Amendments, 25 BuFF. L. Rav. 519, 519 (1975).
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The 1974 Amendments
The Watergate scandal and the nationally televised hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaigns contributed to increased public pressures for reform of
campaign practices.38 On October 15, 1974 Congress passed the
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 197411 (hereinafter 1974 Amendments), amending the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. The 1974 Amendments dramatically altered
the financial framework of presidential campaigns. While the
1971 Act sought to open the funding process to public scrutiny,' 0 the 1974 Amendments revised the fundamental premises
on which the electoral system in this country had rested. Their
key elements were the creation of a federal election commission, imposition of limits on contributions by individuals to
political campaigns, limitation on expenditures by campaigns,
restrictions on the activities of political committees, revisions
of the 1971 program for subsidizing presidential campaigns,
and minor amendment of reporting and disclosure requirements.
The establishment of a federal election commission.
Under the 1971 Act, disclosure of financial information was to
be administered by the filing of periodic reports with designated supervisory officers." The 1974 Amendments expanded
this governmental regulatory function with the creation of a
new federal election commission. 2 The Federal Election Commission as originally constituted by the 1974 Amendments was
composed of six voting members. Two were to be appointed
by the President pro tempore of the Senate, two by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and two by the
38.

See, e.g., D. ADAmANY & G. AoE, supra note 7, at 5; Ervin, supra note 7, at

7-8.
39. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
88 Stat. 1263 (amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225,
86 Stat. 3 (1972)) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47 U.S.C. (Supp. V
1975)) (amended 1976).
40. SENATE REPowr, supra note 35, at 4-5.

41.

See note 25 supra.

42. 2 U.S.C. § 437c (Supp. V 1975) (amended 1976). The operations of the FEC
in its first year have been criticized as overly bureaucratic and vulnerable to splits

along partisan lines on key issues. See, e.g., Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its

Aftermath, and Its Prospects: The Constitutionality of Government Restraints on
PoliticalCampaign Financing,29 VAND. L. Rav. 1327 (1976); Malbin, After Surviving
Its First Election Year, FEC is Wary of the Future, 9 NAT'L J. 469 (1977); PART I,
infra. But see FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 1976 [hereinafter cited
as 1976 FEC REPoir].
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President of the United States." Additionally, the Secretary
of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives
were to sit on the FEC ex officio without the right to vote."
The FEC was empowered by the 1974 Amendments to "formulate general policy" with respect to the Federal Election
Campaign Act,4 to issue advisory opinions," to conduct investigations and hearings 47 to commence and prosecute civil actions to enforce the Act, 48 to refer suspected criminal violations
to-the appropriate law enforcement authorities," and to issue
reports on FEC activities."
Limits on contributions by individuals. The 1974 Amendments prohibited individuals from contributing more than
$1000 to any candidate or campaign for federal office.3 ' However, individuals were permitted to aggregate $500 in certain
personal expenses and to contribute an unlimited amount in
personal services without having the value of those services and
expenses charged against their individual contribution limits."
Moreover, individuals were limited to an aggregate of $25,000
in contributions in a single year to all federal election campaigns."
The 1974 Amendments also imposed limitations on the
amount a candidate for federal office could contribute to his
own election."' The limit was $50,000 for candidates for presi43.

2 U.S.C. § 437c (a)(1)(Supp. V 1975) (amended 1976). This composition was

held unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 109-43 (1976). The FEC was

subsequently restructured by the 1976 Amendments.
44. 2 U.S.C. § 437c (a)(1) (Supp. V 1975) (amended 1976).
45. Id. § 437d(a)(9) (amended 1976).
46. Id. §§ 437d(a)(7), 437f (amended 1976).
47. Id. § 437d(a)(11) (amended 1976).
48. Id. §§ 437d(a)(6), 437g (amended 1976).
49. Id. §§ 437d (a)(11), 437g (a)(6) (amended 1976) (current version at 2
U.S.C.A. § 437d (a)(10) (West Cum. Supp. 1977)).
50. Id. § 437e.
51. 18 U.S.C. 608(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975) (current version at 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a
(a)(1)(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
52. 2 U.S.C. § 431(e)(5) (Supp. V 1975) (amended 1976).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975) (current version codified at 2 U.S.C.A.
§ 441a(a)(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1977). Prior to the 1971 Act there was a $5000 limit
on contributions to candidates for federal office. 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970) (repealed
1971); see Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972: Hearings on S.R. 60 Before the
Select Comm. on PresidentialCampaign Activities of the U.S. Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973). The $5000 contribution limitation has been replaced by the limitations
imposed by the 1974 Amendments.

54. 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976; reenacted in I.R.C. §
9004(d), (e)).
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dent or vice-president," $35,000 for candidates for the United
States Senate,5" and $25,000 for candidates for the United
States House of Representatives. 7
Expenditure limitations. Candidates for federal office were
similarly prohibited under the revised law from spending more
than a fixed sum, periodically adjusted for inflation.58 Candidates for president were limited to aggregate expenditures of
$10 million during the primaries and $20 million for the general
election. 9 Candidates for the United States Senate were limited to the greater of $100,000 or a sum equal to eight cents
multiplied by the voting age population (hereinafter VAP) of
the state in the primaries, and the greater of $150,000 or twelve
cents multiplied by the VAP of the state in the general elections. 0 Candidates for House of Representatives were limited
to $70,000 of expenditures in each election.6
In addition, candidates for all of the above offices could
spend an additional twenty percent over the limit for fundraising purposes. 2 Moreover, candidates for the presidential nomination could not spend in any one state more than twice what
a candidate for nomination to the United States Senate might
spend in that state. 3
Political committees. Committees or other organizations
and associations who had registered with the FEC for more
than six months, received contributions from more than fifty
persons, and made contributions to five or more candidates for
federal office were permitted under the law to give up to $5,000
to a candidate or his campaign." No limitations were imposed
55. Id. § 608(a)(1)(A) (repealed 1976; reenacted in I.R.C. § 9004(d)).
56. Id. § 608(a)(1)(B) (repealed 1976).
57. Id. § 608(a)(1)(C) (repealed 1976).
58. Id. § 608(c)-(d) (repealed 1976).
59. Id. § 608(c)(1)(A)-(B) (repealed 1976; reenacted in 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(b)(1)
(A)-(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1977)).
60. Id. § 608(c)(1)(C)-(D) (repealed 1976).
61. Id. § 608(c)(1)(E) (repealed 1976).
62. Id. § 591(f)(4)(H) (amended 1976) (current version at 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(f)
(4)(I) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); 18 U.S.C.A. § 591(f)(4)(I) (West Cum. Supp. 1977)).
63. Id. § 608(c)(1)(A) (repealed 1976).
64. Id. § 608(b)(2) (repealed 1976). There were 1,166 political action committees
active in 1976. See note 307 infra. Congressman Frank Thompson, Jr. (D-N.J.), chairman of the House Administration Committee, has recently proposed an amendment
to the Campaign Act which would change the criteria for qualifying for the $5000 limit
granted multicandidate committees. To qualify, the committee must: 1) receive contributions from at least 50 persons within the previous 3 years, and 2) contribute at
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on the aggregate amount any committee might contribute during any period."
Public financing of presidential election campaigns. The
1974 Amendments revised the method of allocating funds to
presidential candidates adopted by the Tax Checkoff plan of
1971. During the primaries candidates for president were permitted to elect to receive matching federal funds for each individual private contribution of $250 or less." These funds became available once the candidate had been certified by the
FEC as having received a threshold amount of $5,000 of matchable contributions ($250 or less) in each of twenty states." The
election to receive the matching funds committed the candidate to the overall expenditure limitations of the Campaign
Act." Nominees of major parties" were each entitled to receive
public funds for use in the general election.10 Nominees of
minor parties"' were eligible to receive the same ratio of monies
allocated to major party nominees as the ratio their performance (based on votes received) in the previous presidential election bore to major party candidates."2 New parties 3 could recieve post-election reimbursement of expenses if they garnered
more than five percent of the popular vote based on the same
formula used for minor parties." Major parties were further
eligible to receive $2 million to pay for their national nominatleast $500 to each of 5 or more candidates within the previous 3 years. CAMPAIGN PRACS.

REPS., Nov. 28, 1977, at 2.
65. As a practical matter, any such limitations would merely result in a
proliferation of committees to serve as conduits as under the earlier $5,000 contribution
limits.
See note 53 supra.
66. I.R.C. § 9034 (amended 1976).
67. Id. §§ 9005, 9033(b) (amended 1976). The FEC had certified $24,777,329
in federal matching funds to 15 candidates in presidential primaries
as of April 14,
1977. 3 FED. ELECTION COMMISSION REc. no. 5, at 4 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as FEC
RECORD]. Of the amount certified through Dec. 31, 1976 (approximately
$24.3 million), 84% had been certified to 6 candidates (Ronald Reagan, Gerald
Ford, Jimmy
Carter, George Wallace, Henry Jackson, and Morris Udall). 1976 FEC RXPORT,
supra
note 42, at 17.
68. I.R.C. § 9033(b) (amended 1976).
69. For the definition of "major party," see note 31 supra.
70. I.R.C. § 9004(a)(1).
71. For the definition of "minor party," see note 33 supra.
72. I.R.C. § 9004(a)(2)(A). The ratio may be otherwise expressed by the
following
equation:
Election Fund Payment to Minor Party = Popular Vote for Minor.Party
Election Fund Payment to Major Party
Popular Vote for Major Party
73. "New Parties" are defined as parties which are neither "major parties"
nor
"minor parties."
74. I.R.C. § 9004(a)(3) (amended 1976). Examples of eligibility under
the new
law are provided in SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, at 19-27.
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ing conventions.7 5 Minor parties were eligible for a pro rata
amount for convention expenses based on past performance in
presidential elections."
Additionally, the 1974 Amendments provided that the
funds for these payments to candidates and political parties
were to be appropriated by Congress from revenues designated
for this purpose by individuals on their tax returns."
Disclosure and reporting requirements. The 1974 Amendments made no substantial changes in the disclosure requirements established by the 1971 Act.78 Under the 1971 Act,. andidates were required to disclose the name, address, occupation,
and principal place of business, if any, of each contrilitor of
more than $100.78 This threshold was retained by the 1974
Amendments. ° With the establishment of the FEC, however,
certain administrative changes were made in reporting procedures.S'
More significantly, the 1974 Amendments required individuals, who in a calendar year made independent expenditures exceeding $100 in connection with a campaign for federal
office, other than through a contribution to a campaign committee, to file a report with the FEC.82 Similarly, political com75. As of March 18, 1977, the FEC had certified $2,010,780 (including a $170,085
"payback" under IRC § 9008(h)) to the Democratic National Committee for its convention costs and $1,581,664 to the Republican National Committee (including a
$382,136 "payback"). See FEC RECORD, supra note 67.
76. I.R.C. § 9008(b)(2).
77. Id. § 6096. Individual taxpayers may designate $1 and taxpayers filing joint
returns may designate $2 which is to be paid into the Presidential Election Campaign
Fund. See Id. § 9006. The designation neither increases the amount of taxes owed nor
reduced any refund due the taxpayer.
Despite the fact that the "check-off" option of I.R.C. § 6096 costs the taxpayer
nothing, the vast majority still do not elect to so mark their returns. The Internal
Revenue Service recently reported that only 26.5% of the returns filed through Feb.
18, 1976 exercised the option, a slight increase from the 23.9% at that time in 1975.
Wall St. J., March 3, 1976, at 1, col. 5.
78. See text accompanying notes 17-27 supra.
79. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, § 304(b)(2), 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(2)
(Supp. 11 1972).
80. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, § 202, 2 U.S.C. §
434(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
81. One of the more significant administrative changes requires political committees making contributions or expenditures on behalf of a candidate to report such
transactions to the candidate's principal campaign committee. 2 U.S.C. § 432(f)
(Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976; reenacted in 2 U.S.C.A. § 432(a) (West Cum. Supp.

1977)).
82. Id. § 434(e) (repealed 1976; reenacted in 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(e)(1) (West Cum.
Supp. 1977)).
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mittees receiving or expending more than $1000 in a calendar
year were required to register with the FEC and file reports
which identified the source of contributions of $100 or more.M
Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionalityof the Reforms"'
The 1974 Amendments went into effect on January 1, 1975.
On January 2 opponents of the measure, led by Senator James
Buckley (Conservative-N.Y.) and former Senator Eugene
McCarthy (D-Minn.)," filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, charging the law was unconstitutional. The district court directed that the case be
transmitted to the court of appeals." After permitting intervention by various groups and individuals, the case was remanded to the district court for certain determinations of
matters of fact and law. Subsequently on plenary review, the
court of appeals "rejected, for the most part, appellants'
[plaintiffs'] constitutional attacks.

87

Contemporaneous with

this ruling, most of the candidates for the nomination of the
Democratic Party had formally commenced their campaigns.
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court handed down its
most comprehensive decision on the constitutionality of regulation of federal elections.8 Not surprisingly, the opinion affected
83. Id. §§ 433, 434 (amended 1976). Political committees were further required
to record the identity of each contributor who gave more than $10. Id. § 432(c)(2)
(amended 1976) (currently $50 threshold).
1
84. For an in depth look at the constitutionality of the reforms, see Comment,
Buckley v. Valeo: The Supreme Court and Federal Campaign Reform, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 852 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Campaign Reform]; Comment, The Constitutionality of Limitations on Individual Political CampaignContributionsand Expenditures: The Supreme Courts Decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 25 EMoRY L.J. 400 (1976).
85. Other plaintiffs included the New York Civil Liberties Union, Human Events
(a conservative magazine), the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency-McCarthy
'76, the Conservative Party of the State of New York, the Mississippi Republican
Party, the Libertarian Party, the American Conservative Union, the Conservative
Victory Fund, and General Motors heir, Stewart Mott.
86. See Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
87. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 10 (1976). The Supreme Court heard oral
argument in Buckley on November 10, 1975. After this, and prior to its decision on
the law's constitutionality, the Court permitted interim federal matching monies to
be authorized by the FEC. [1975] U.S. S. CT. BuLL. B355 (Nov. 22, 1975). Many of
the interviews for this article were conducted while this question of interim funding
was before the Court. Its presence as an issue contributed to some of the uncertainty
and frustration expressed by a number of interviewees, particularly campaign managers, since the absence of these interim subsidies would have created serious cash flow
problems for most campaigns.
88. See generally Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath, and Its
Prospects: The Constitutionality of Government Restraints on Political Campaign
Financing,29 VAND. L. REV. 1327 (1976).
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virtually all of the component parts of the Campaign Act.
The Federal Election Commission. With respect to the
FEC, the Court held that the manner in which the members
of the Commission were appointed under the 1974 Amendments violated the principle of separation of powers."9 This
conflict arose because four of the Commission's six voting
members were appointed by members of the legislative branch,
yet the Commission was charged with enforcement and rulemaking authority, which is the domain of the executive
branch. 0 The Court gave those past acts of the FEC, which
previously had been confined to "Officers of the United
States," de facto validity9 ' and granted a thirty day stay of
judgment to "afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute
the Commission."
Contribution limits. In its per curiam opinion,93 the Court
affirmed the power of Congress to impose limitations on individual contributions to campaigns for federal office." It held
that the limited effect upon first amendment freedoms was
sufficiently justified by the need to protect federal elections
from corruption and to prevent real or imagined coercion of
95
candidates after their election to governmental offices. Simi89. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,134-35 (1976).
90. Id. at 118-19.
91. See id. at 142.
92. Id. at 143. The Court issued an additional 20 day stay of judgment the day
before the original 30 days was to expire. The Commission's powers expired on March
22, 1976, see N.Y. Times, March 23, 1976, at 20, col. 3, and were not restored until
the President reappointed the Commissioners under the 1976 Amendments on May 21,
1976. See N.Y. Times, May 22, 1976, at 1, col. 6. The result of this interruption in
the Commission's powers meant that during a crucial point in the 1976 primaries
candidates were unable to receive federal matching funds or receive definitive interpretations of the law in the form of advisory opinions. See J. WrrcovER, supra note 1,
at 219-21.
93. The Court's per curiam opinion reflected the diversity of views among the
Justices on the constitutionality of the various provisions of the law. The opinion was
joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Powell. Justice Marshall joined except for
the decision to hold limitations on the use of personal funds unconstitutional. Justice
Rehnquist joined except for the decision to allow public financing of elections. Justice
Blackmun joined except for the portion of the decision covering contribution limitations. Chief Justice Burger joined only those portions striking down expenditure limits
and ordering reconstitution of the FEC. Justice White joined the decision only in the
portion covering public financing. Justice Stevens was not yet a member of the Court
during the argument and took no part.
94. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1976). The Court noted, moreover, that
arguments going to the exact size of contribution limitations were questions of "fine
tuning" for legislative rather than judicial scrutiny. Id. at 30.
95. Id. at 25-29. Two alternative justifications were also advanced by appellees:
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larly, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the $5000 limitation on contributions by political committees as both enhancing the ability of organizations and groups to participate
in the electoral process and preventing evasion of limitations
on individual contributions." The limits placed on expenses
incurred by volunteers in assisting candidates were also upheld
as a logical extension of limits on monetary donations by individuals. 7 The Court also affirmed the constitutionality of the
$25,000 limitation on total contributions by an individual in a
calendar year."
Expenditure limits. The Court drew a fundamental distinction between contributions and expenditures." The Court
observed that contributions affect speech only through their
transformation into the speech of another.1°° In the Court's
view, restrictions on the amount of contribution did not affect
the quantity of communication permitted, but rather "[alt
most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index
of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate.""1 1 In contrast, a restriction on campaign expenditures
''necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration,
and the size of the audience reached."' 02 On the basis of this
distinction the Court held that the governmental interests
which had been sufficient to warrant limitations on contributions'0 3 were inadequate to justify the 1974 Amendments' $1000
limitation on individual expenditures "relative to a clearly
first, the law was necessary to "mute the voices of affluent persons and groups," and
"equalize" the voices of all citizens in affecting elections, and second,
it was necessary
to help slow the "skyrocketing cost of political campaigns." Id. at 25-26. The Court
found it unnecessary to look past the need to prevent corruption, since that justification alone was held sufficient to sustain the law. Id. at 26.
96. Id. at 35-36.
97. Id. at 36.
98. Id. at 38. The Court noted that the question had not been separately addressed by the parties at length, but concluded that the quite modest restraint prevented evasion of individual contribution limits by numerous contributions to political
committees or parties. Id.
99. See Campaign Reform, supra note 84, at 858-61. See also Clagett & Bolton,
supra note 88, at 1038.
100. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).
101. Id. at 21. But see Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?
85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1014 (1976) (the size of a contribution "provides a hopelessly inadequate measure of intensity as felt by the giver").
102. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
103. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
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identified candidate."'' Thus, the Court held that, while restrictions on the amount an individual could contribute to a
candidate or a political committee were permissible, restrictions on the amount an individual could independently expend
advocating the election or defeat of a candidate were not. 10
The Court similarly held unconstitutional restrictions on
the amount of personal funds a candidate could use in his own
campaign. 0 1The Court observed that the governmental interest in preventing corruption did not extend to expenditures
from a candidate's personal or family resources.'0 Thus, the
Court classified a candidate's use of his own personal wealth
as an "expenditure" rather than a "contribution," exempting
it from limitation. The possibility that a restraint on the use
of personal funds would equalize the opportunities of citizens
to pursue public office was dismissed as "not sufficient to justify the provision's infringement of fundamental First Amendment rights."'0 8 Moreover, such inequities could be minimized
by the superior fundraising efforts of candidates with less personal wealth.'
Finally, the Court held the limitations on overall campaign expenditures unconstitutional.1 0 The Court noted that
the "major evil" associated with escalating campaign costs was
the improper influence of large contributions and found that
this had been alleviated by the Act's restrictions on the amount
of individual contributions."' However, the Court concluded
that Congress could condition the receipt of public funds for
use in campaigns on the agreement by the candidate to abide
by specified limitations on expenditures." 2
104. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,19 (1976). The limitation was contained in 18
U.S.C. § 608(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976) (current version at 2 U.S.C.A. §
44ia(a)(1)(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1977)).
105. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42 (1976). The Court had initially been troubled by the vagueness of the term "relative" to a candidate, but held that it must be
read in context with other language in the statute giving it the meaning "advocating
the election or defeat of such candidate." Id. Even this narrow reading, however, did
not save the prohibition.
106. Id. at 52-54. See notes 54-57 and accompanying text supra. The 1976
Amendments reinstituted the limitation on personal expenditures by candidates accepting federal subsidies.
107. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53 (1976).
108. Id. at 54.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 55-58. The limitations on overall expenditures were repealed by the
1976 Amendments and reenacted in a form that applies only to candidates accepting
federal funds. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
111. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 55 (1976).
112. Id. at 57 n.65. In a subsequent article, the attorneys for the appellants in
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Public financing of elections. In this area, the Court upheld all the provisions for public financing of campaigns over
arguments that the resultant system was unduly restrictive of
minor party candidates' participation in the electoral process,
"contrary to the general welfare," and "inconsistent with
the
First Amendment.""' The Court found earlier ballot-access
cases which employed an "alternative-means" analysis inapposite' 4 since campaigns can be carried out without public
financing under the Act." 5 Appellants' arguments against public financing of nominating conventions were rejected on similar grounds."' Finally, the Court approved the system of primary election financing of candidates through the use of
matching funds," 7 concluding that it did not discriminate
against candidates not running in primaries"' or improperly
increase the influence of individuals able to contribute matchable sums while deducting part of their contribution from their
tax liability." 9
Disclosure and reporting requirements. The Court also
upheld the constitutionality of these requirements since the
governmental interests in providing the voters with information on how campaign money is raised and spent were sufficient
to outweigh the possibility of infringement on the exercise of
first amendment rights.2 0 The Court reasoned that this information enabled the voter "to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the
basis of party labels and campaign speeches."' The Court saw
additional justification for any infringement in the fact that
these requirements operated to deter and expose corruption as
Buckley contended that the decision of the Court to allow otherwise unconstitutional
limits on expenditures by candidates choosing to accept government subsidies would
further inject the government into the political process. See Clagett & Bolton, supra
note 88, at 1336-37.
113. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976).
114. Id. at 100-01. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson,
403 U.S. 431 (1971).
115. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 101 (1976).
116. Id. at 104. Funding of nominating conventions is provided for in I.R.C. §
9008. See note 75 supra.
117. See notes 66-76 and accompanying text supra.
118. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 105-06 (1976).
119. Id. at 107-08 & n.146.
120. Id. at 66 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-564, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1971)). See
also CAMPAIGN PRACS. REPs., Dec. 12, 1977, at 6-7.
121. Id. at 67.
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well as accumulate data for enforcing other valid provisions of
the law. 2 '
In the wake of Buckley, major adjustments needed to be
made in the election laws. The congressional response was the
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976.
The 1976 Amendments
After Buckley, Congress enacted the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1976 (hereinafter 1976 Amendments) .113 The most significant change these amendments produced, was the reconstitution of the FEC along the lines articulated by the Court in Buckley. Under the 1976 Amendments,
all six voting members are appointed by the President of the
United States.' The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of
125
the House of Representatives continue to sit ex officio.
In response to the portion of Buckley which held limitations on independent expenditures unconstitutional, Congress
tightened the reporting rules on such expenditures by requiring
that the reports include a notarized statement that they were
in fact made without consultation with the campaign.' Similarly, these amendments more clearly defined what constitutes
an independent expenditure.'27
Also, the 1976 Amendments added a $5000 limit on contributions by individuals to political committees,' and a $20,000
2
aggregate limit on contributions to national political parties. '
122. Id.
123. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,
90 Stat. 475 (amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225,
86 Stat. 3 (1972)) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18 U.S.C.A. (West Cum. Supp.
1977)).
124. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437c(a)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977). The Amendments also
recodified under Title 2 those sections of the Campaign Act formerly in Title 18.
Additionally, they gave the FEC exclusive civil jurisdiction in enforcement proceedings
more
under the Campaign Act. Id. §§ 437c(b)(1), 437d(a)(6), (e), and spelled out
closely procedures for enforcement, including intermediate conciliation steps. Id. §
437g.
125. Id.§ 437c(a)(1).
126. Id. § 434(e).
127. Independent expenditures were defined in the 1974 Amendments as:
"relative to a clearly identified candidate ... advocating the election or defeat of a
to
clearly identified candidate." This language was changed in the 1976 Amendments
independent
be
to
that
required
and
candidate
a
advocating
"expressly"
expenditures
the expenditures not be "made in concert with or at the request or suggestion" of the
or consulcandidate or his agents and that they be made "without [the] cooperation
tation" of the candidate. Id. § 431(p).
128. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(C).
129. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(B).
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Multicandidate committees were limited to $15,000 in contributions to parties.'3 0 The amendments also retained the overall
expenditure limitations on presidential candidates accepting
federal funds. 3 ' Similarly, they limited the use of personal
funds by a candidate accepting federal monies.'32 Finally, they
provided new guidelines for both corporate and union segregated funds' 3 and internal communications advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.'
With the legal framework of the Campaign Act in mind,
it is important to explore how this new structure functions as
a regulatory device. By focusing on how the law is administered
one is better able to evaluate whether or not the Act has been
successful in the attainment of its objectives.
Two: THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE LAW
Campaigns traditionally have been loosely administered
relative to the vast sums of money involved. Responsibilities
for handling finances, donations, and expenditures were generally distributed among so many committees and organizations,
both nationally and locally, that centralized control seemed a
rather unworkable proposition.' The most immediate and
dramatic effect of the 1971 Act and the 1974 Amendments was
to draw all these disparate committees and organizations under
one centralized framework.3' This was accomplished by compelling campaigns to institute more businesslike procedures
and by creating a federal regulatory agency to administer and
enforce the law. The burden of complying with these new regulatory procedures falls squarely on the campaigns who must
submit the data required by the FEC. In turn, the FEC must
collect, digest, and disseminate the data collected so that it can
detect violations of the law and the public can monitor campaign contributions.
PART

130. Id. § 441a(a)(2)(B).
131. Id. § 441a(b)(1).
132. I.R.C. § 9035.
133. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
134. Id. § 431(f)(4)(C). What constitutes an internal communication, however,
can be very broad in scope. In 1976, for example, unions expended vast sums
of money
on communications to their memberships urging the election of various candidates.
See Malbin, Labor Business and Money-A Post-Election Analysis, 9 NAT'L
J. 412
(1977).
135. D. ADAMANY & G. AGEE, supra note 7, at 83-84; Developments in
the
Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1111, 1233-37 (1975).
136. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 432, 434, 437b (West Cum. Supp. 1977). For a closer examination of the impact of these changes see Fleishman, supra note 37, at 861-62.
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Burdens of Compliance
One serious criticism leveled at the new law arises out of
the administrative burdens it places on campaigns.'37 While the
new regulatory procedures might make accountants more comfortable, they are the most persistent target of complaints by
campaign managers. The most frequently raised concern is the
amount of time and other office resources expended on compliance. The campaign manager for Senator Henry Jackson (DWash.) pointed to the large amounts of volunteer time spent
photocopying each contribution check and recording the requisite information for reporting purposes.'3 8 Another time
consuming requirement of the new law is the periodic audit
conducted by the FEC. A visit to the Shriver headquarters
shortly before an impending audit disclosed detailed instructions to the staff on how to assist the FEC auditors. At the
headquarters of the Harris campaign, an inspection of the
offices revealed a disproportionate number of staff members
involved in bookkeeping and the recording of data required by
the Act in comparison to those involved in campaign efforts
not governed by these technical requirements. Moreover, the
reporting requirements may have an adverse effect on the
spontaneous campaign for federal office as noted by Robert
Moss, General Counsel to the Clerk of the United States
House of Representatives:
The administrative aspects of the law tend to discourage
the citizen candidate from participation. The election reforms are like the Democratic delegate selection reforms-we've reformed ourselves right back into the backrooms. It ends up in the hands of people who have specialized expertise . . . .The citizen who gets angry enough
about something to want to run [for office] gets hit with
a package of forms and rulings by the FEC that he can't
even read.' 9
Despite these burdens, the campaign officials generally
137. See Malbin, After Surviving Its First Election Year, FEC is Wary of the
Future, 9 NAT'L J. 469 (1977).
138. Interview with Robert Keefe, campaign manager for Senator Henry Jackson, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 18, 1975).
139. Interview with Robert Moss, General Counsel to the Clerk of the House of
Representatives, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 19, 1975). This fear of deterrence of participation by the nonprofessional was also expressed by Mike Wetherall of Senator
Church's staff: "Even if he never exercises it, the fact that a farmer in Idaho feels that
he can run if he wants to is an important safety valve. The problems of compliance
with the FEC may make that feeling even less real." Interview with Mike Wetherall,
Senate staff of Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 22, 1975).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

recognized the need for the regulations. The criticisms focused
on how the system could be improved and did not attack the
need for reporting itself. The campaign manager for Sargent
Shriver, expressed what appeared to be the consensus:
I philosophically agree completely with the need for the
reporting and disclosure requirements, but it costs us
money and time in a situation in which those are even
more precious commodities than before. We have to photograph each check, go through detailed recording of the
occupation and address . . . but I guess it is justified in

the public interest.1" 0
The FEC recognized the problems generated by compliance
with the new law. In its 1976 annual report, the Commission
noted that "[blurdensome and cumbersome requirements
and procedures only blunt the impact of reform legislation and
discourage honest people from entering politics.""' Accordingly, approximately half of the legislative recommendations
made to Congress by the Commission were aimed at simplifying the administrative procedures necessary for compliance
with the law."'

One approach taken by the FEC to reduce the burdens of
compliance has been to relax the reporting requirements. When
the FEC began administering the Act, it demanded strict compliance with these requirements. An examination of the files in
the Commission's Public Records Office' indicated numerous
instances in which a candidate's report was returned to the
campaign on the grounds that some details had been omitted
despite the fact that the identity of a contributor was readily
discernable.'1' This strict interpretation of the Act's reporting
requirements resulted in thirty percent of the reports filed with
the FEC being deemed "inadequate."' As a result, the Commission adopted a "substantial compliance" approach, with
guidelines which provided that if eighty percent of the required
140.

Interview with Dick Murphy, campaign manager for Sargent Shriver, in

Washington, D.C. (Dec. 16, 1975).
141. 1976 FEC REPoir, supra note 42, at 61.
142. Id.
143. The examination of the records was made during a visit to the
FEC Public
Records Office on Dec. 18, 1975.
144. For example, a contribution to Senator Bentsen was listed by
name, home
address, home telephone, and occupation, which in that instance was
farmer. Presumably because it was the same as his home address, his business address
was not-listed.
The report was returned to the Bentsen campaign with a stern letter
ordering compliance, a copy of which was placed in files available to the public.
145. 1976 FEC REPORT, supra note 42, at 61.
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information in a given category was present the report would
be accepted. If the report fell below this standard, a "Request
for Additional Information" was sent to the campaign.'" If
not forthcoming, enforcement remedies
compliance was still
47
considered.'
were
The FEC has also recognized that another way to reduce
the burdens of compliance would be to eliminate audits during
the campaign itself, and rely instead on strict enforcement of
the law where individuals have filed complaints with the Commission alleging that violations actually occurred.'" To accomplish this the FEC established a new audit policy after the 1976
elections. The new policy provides that audits for House and
Senate races will not be conducted during the campaign period. However, presidential campaigns receiving matching
funds will continue to be treated separately based on their
receipt of federal funds and will continue to be subject to audits
during the course of the campaign.'49
Management of Disclosed Information
One point of general agreement about the new reforms, is
the necessity for the disclosure provisions. Even the strongest
opponents of campaign reform concede the need for mandatory
reporting of the sources of campaign funds. 5 " Despite this consensus there remains some question as to how this contribution
information will be digested and used by the voting public. It
is the sheer volume of raw data collected by the FEC that
makes disclosure less than the panacea its proponents envisioned. In 1976 alone, the FEC received reports from 9000 persons and committees required to file with it.' Additionally, it
146. Id. at 21-22. Strict requirements of full disclosure were retained for large
contributions or expenditures. The Commission's adoption of substantial compliance
guidelines were motivated in large measure by its own difficulties in reviewing all of
the reports generated by the strict compliance approach.
147. See id. at 52.
148. Congressman Frank Thompson, Jr. (D-N.J.), chairman of the House Administration Committee, has recently proposed an amendment to the Campaign Act
which would allow the FEC to conduct audits of campaigns only in connection with
possible violations of the Act. CAMPAIGN PRAcs. REPs., Nov. 28, 1977, at 1-2.
149. The FEC has discretionary power to select which campaigns to audit and
when, except for presidential campaigns which are subject to mandatory audits after
each presidential election. See IRC § 9007(a).
150. See Supreme Court Proceedings, Arguments Before the Court, 44 U.S.L.W.
3289 (Nov. 18, 1975); SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, at 5-b. See also Clagett & Bolton,
supra note 88, at 1358.
151. 1976 FEC REPORT, supra note 42, at 31.
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estimates that each reporting entity can be expected to file
twelve to fifteen sets of documents each election year, placing
the total at around 100,000 reports. 152 This has resulted in over
1.1 million pages of reports being made available to the public,
over half of which were 1976 filings.'53
The Commission has acknowledged a need for wider dissemination of this data. Its 1976 annual report noted that the
"primary obstacle
to fuller disclosure

. . .

is the need to get the

data out of Washington to the local level where the campaign
is conducted."'' 5 The Commission initially tried to accomplish
this by making microfilm copies of reports available to the
public in its Public Records Office in Washington.' In early
1976, however, the Commission instituted a computer system
for its own use in reviewing documents and for public review
"where appropriate."' Although the newly
established FEC
Office of Data Systems and Development began operation in
August, 1976, initial programming and processing of back
documents made its first months "considerably more difficult
than envisioned."' Ultimately, the computer is expected to
facilitate a number of functions, particularly the preparation
of indexes that will make reported data easier to retrieve and
more useful.'
Whatever the mechanisms established for retrieval of this
information, its ultimate value depends on close monitoring by
private groups equipped to handle the task. Three groups were
pointed to as the primary sources of monitoring the disclosed
data: the press, independent organizations, and the campaigns
themselves. Each of the three, however, seemed confident one
of the other two would carry the burden. Inquiries to the Jackson, Harris, Shriver, and Church campaigns revealed that no
clear procedure was established, or even contemplated to check
the disclosed information emanating from the campaigns of
their opponents.'59 One campaign manager stated the general
152. Id.
153. Id. at IV.
154. Id.at 35.
155. Id.at IV.
156. Id.at 33.
157. Id.
158. Id.at 34.
159. There were, however, instances of candidates for other federal
offices making effective use of disclosed information. The campaign staff of Tom
Hayden, candidate for the Democratic nomination for the United States Senate
from California,
examined the reports of the then incumbent Senator John Tunney (D-Cal.),
and made

CAMPAIGN ACT

1978]

assumption: "Common Cause and the New York Times will
take care of it."'"" Yet, discussions with representatives of those
organizations revealed a different situation. Warren Weaver of
the New York Times stated:
I guess it is assumed that [the effectiveness of disclosure]
depends on guys like me being willing to go over and slug
our way through. But frankly, we have no plans to do that.
I have gone over there once just to look at the operation,
but once you've limited the contributions to one thousand
dollars, there aren't going to be any newsworthy stories,
although there may be some interest in which committees
are giving what to whom. We'll probably just wait for the
Common Cause report.'
Completing the circle, Fred Wertheimer of Common Cause
asserted that the campaign organizations would be the principal group monitoring disclosure in an effort to discover information damaging to their opponents. Common Cause's own
experience in 1974 led to the abandonment of much of its monitoring project, primarily because of the expense involved and
the complexity of the operation. "The [computer] programming problems are murder," Mr. Wertheimer explained, "and
we just don't have the money to pursue it."' 2 Other independent organizations, in addition to Common Cause, may potentially play an important role in monitoring reported information. For example, Bill Dodds, political director of the United
Auto Workers, stated emphatically: "We read closely what
came out in the papers [in earlier elections] and then alerted
people as to who was getting what. We have people who regularly follow the reports and other organizations do the same
thing. .

.

.And I would think that any serious campaign had

better do it."' 3 Mr. Dodds sees the monitoring of such reports
as an important activity which can be carried on independent
of campaigns and thus, would not be subject to contribution
limitations."'
extensive political use of disclosed contributions from persons purportedly related to

oil company interests. Telephone interview with Carole Cullum, campaign manager,
Tom Hayden for U.S. Senate, in Palo Alto, Cal. (Feb. 3, 1976).
160.

161.

Interview with Dick Murphy, supra note 140.

Interview with Warren Weaver, N.Y. Times Washington Correspondent, in

Washington, D.C. (Dec. 29, 1975).
162. Interview with Fred Wertheimer, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 26, 1975).
163. Interview with Bill Dodds, political director of the United Auto Workers, in
Potomac, Md. (Dec. 28, 1975).

164.

Id.
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As the Supreme Court observed in Buckley, disclosure is
the key to enforcement of most of the other aspects of the law,
particularly the aggregate individual contribution limits.'
In
light of the difficulties inherent in monitoring the collected
data, it appears that the most significant benefit of disclosure
will be its possible deterrent effect on potential contributors
who might prefer to remain in the background. Unless effective
procedures are established which facilitate the prompt disclosure of the sources of campaign funds, campaigns will lose the
incentive to fashion tight internal control of these sources. This
will ultimately reduce the deterrent effect of the law and create
a situation where the spirit of the campaign reform measures
can be easily evaded.
Enforcement
The passage of campaign finance reform legislation was
largely the result of the public outrage that grew out of the
scandals subsequent to the 1972 presidential election. As that
pressure subsides, continued adherence to the new procedures
will become primarily dependent upon the enforcement mechanisms established during the periods of high public interest
in
campaign reform. Although some elements of the law are theoretically self enforcing, such as the disclosure provisions and
contribution limits, it may be assumed from past experience
that as public attention shifts, traditional campaign pressures
will inexorably resume their paramount position and violations
will occur.'
The establishment of the FEC as an administrative and
enforcement mechanism was seen as the solution to this problem.' However, since its creation, the Commission has been
among the most controversial aspects of the new system despite its relatively low public profile. Much of the early opposition to the FEC was spearheaded by then Congressman Wayne
Hays (D-Ohio). While the bill creating the FEC was in the
House Administration Committee, Hays repeatedly sought
to
add amendments which would have shifted many of the functions and powers essential to the FEC's operation to other
governmental organs.' Although this effort failed, the estab165. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976).
166. See Fleishman, supra note 37, at 861-62.
167. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, at 16; Biden,
Public Financingof
Elections: Legislative Proposals and Constitutional Questions,
69 Nw. U. L. REv. 1,
42-43 (1974); Fleishmen, supra note 37, at 861-62.
168. Although many important reforms were eliminated
in the House Commit-
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lishment of the FEC was followed by several skirmishes between it and House foes over the Commission's operations.
Generally, the Commission lost most of these early feuds."'
These battles over the powers of the Commission are indicative of the importance placed, by both proponents and foes of
election reform, on the need for an effective enforcement mech170
anism. Such a need was illustrated by Mr. Moss, who as
counsel to the Clerk of the House of Representatives was
charged with discovering violations of the 1971 Act prior to the
FEC being impaneled. During that period, Mr. Moss noted
that his office referred over 14,000 violations of the Act to the
Justice Department, of which he estimated forty to fifty percent involved incumbent members of the House. Nevertheless,
Mr. Moss stated that to his knowledge the Justice Department
tee, other attacks which might have succeeded in making the law meaningful were
resisted. See S. CONF. REP. No. 1237, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974), reprintedin [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 5618. For example, such House amendments as placing
the examination and audit function under the Comptroller General rather than the
FEC, loosening contribution and expenditure limitations or setting expenditure limits
so low as to make challenges to incumbents virtually impossible were not removed
until a joint House-Senate conference. Id. at 5621-25, 5652-53, 5684.
169. Many of these defeats were attributable in large measure to political blunders. One example of this tactical indifference displayed by the FEC involved rulemaking procedures. Under the law, rules promulgated by the Commission took effect
within 30 days unless the House acted to reject them. 2 U.S.C. § 438(c)(2) (Supp. V
1975). Rather than allowing a number of noncontroversial rulings to pass through as a
matter of course, however, among the first acts sent by the Commission to the House
were rulings directly challenging some of the most cherished perquisites of incumbency. The first such measure was the promulgation of a rule which would have placed
congressional office accounts within the law governing expenditure limits. Robert
Moss, General Counsel to the Clerk of the House and who in that position participated
in most of the Commission's meetings, commented that the Commission "couldn't
have possibly picked a worse terrain to fight on, . . . office accounts have traditionally
been one of the most jealously guarded prerogatives of House members. Interview
with Robert Moss, supra note 139. The Senate rejected the proposed rule, but the
controversy was quickly succeeded by what is usually referred to as.the "point of
entry" dispute. The issue itself centered on a rather innocuous and technical procedure; whether reports by candidates for the House and Senate were to be filed initially with the Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate respectively, or instead
with the FEC. The underlying struggle was more significant, however, for it was in
substance an indication of the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the Commission. The
result was termed by Mr. Moss "a symbolic compromise." Id. Under the resulting
agreements, reports of candidates for the House and Senate go to the Clerk or Secretary of the Senate first, and then within 48 hours a microfilmed copy is to go to the
FEC; hard copies are then to follow as quickly as practicable. Federal Election Commission Notice 1975-91, Interim guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 58,617 (1975). See also Clagett
& Bolton, supra note 88.
170. See text accompanying note 139 supra.
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had not acted on a single violation and he expected none to
occur.'
David Fiske, press spokesman for the FEC, agreed with
the accuracy of this report, and remarked that it lay at the
foundation of the need for the FEC:
The only way a law like this can work effectively is through
voluntary compliance-and there will be voluntary compliance only so long as all those affected by [the law] are
convinced it is being equitably enforced as to everyone...
without an independent administrative agency charged
with such a responsibility, that confidence will break down
sooner or later."
Despite the tension between Congress and the FEC, the
1976 Amendments resulted in an expansion of its enforcement
powers. They gave the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over
civil enforcement proceedings, 3 and spelled out more clearly
the intermediate concilliatory steps to be taken by it before
formally instituting such action. 7 ' This shifting of responsibil-

ity for enforcement to the Commission is an essential step
in
preventing the Campaign Act from becoming as ineffective
as
its predecessors.
Although a strong Commission is essential to effective regulation of elections, it nonetheless must operate in an area
of
sensitive constitutionally protected liberties. The Commission,
while giving due regard to the powers that Congress and
the
courts traditionally exercise over independent regulatory agencies, must develop procedures for effective enforcement that
do
not unduly intrude upon the electoral process. Critics of
the
Campaign Act and the Commission have been quick to point
out the potential for abuse if the FEC is permitted to exercise
the traditional prerogatives 7 1 of administrative agencies in this
area:
[T]he election law is both highly complex and in
many respects vague. In these circumstances, the power to
171. Interview with Robert Moss, supra note 139. The FEC had
319 enforcement
cases in 1975-76, of which 22 led to civil action.
172. Interview with David Fiske, public information director
of FEC, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 22, 1976). See text accompanying notes 145-149
supra.
173. See 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 437c(b)(1), 437d(a)(6), (e) (West Cum.
Supp. 1977).
174. See id. § 437g. As of April 1, 1977, the Commission had
instituted 28 civil
suits in federal district courts. Each of these suits involved failure
of candidates to file
reports required by the Campaign Act, and was preceded by
at least two notices of
delinquency. FEC RECORD, supra note 67, no. 5, at 3.
175. See, e.g., W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE, ADMINIsTRATIvE
LAW 23-53 (6th ed. 1974).
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interpret the law is largely the power to make new law. An
agency with this kind of power has vast influence over the
political process, including the power to determine the results of particular elections. The Commission has used
these powers with a vengeance. The Commission's pronouncements make new law-sometimes in areas in which
the statute as enacted by the Congress was silent and
sometimes in rather striking disregard of what the statute
did say ....

"I

The 1976 elections gave some indication of the difficulties
that will be encountered in trying to strike a proper balance.
The impact of even rumors of impropriety by a candidate was
illustrated in the campaign for the United States Senate in
Tennessee. In the final week of that campaign, local newspapers reported that the FEC had subpoenaed campaign
records of one of the candidates. The report was based on a
leak later traced to the chairman of the FEC and a staff member. 171 Although the candidate against whom the allegation
was made ultimately won the election, the danger of improper
78
interference in elections was demonstrated.'
The functioning of the enforcement apparatus of the FEC
came into play most dramatically in the case of Governor Milton Shapp of Pennsylvania. The Shapp campaign as of April
14, 1977 had been certified by the FEC to receive $299,066.21
79
in federal matching funds.' On May 12, 1977, however, the
Commission ordered Shapp to return the funds on the grounds
that records had been falsified as to the true source of contribu8°
tions in order to qualify for matching funds.1
The Shapp development demonstrates that the FEC staff
can effectively monitor campaigns and detect violations. However, the Shapp case raises the additional problem of the tim176. Clagett & Bolton, supra note 88, at 1353-56.
177. No Prosecutionin Election "Leak," S.F. Chron., May 27, 1977, at 6, col. 1.
An FEC staff report was sent to the Department of Justice naming Vernon E. Thomson, chairman of the FEC, and Victoria Ann Tigwell, an FEC staff member, as responsible for the leak of an FEC investigation of James Sasser, then Democratic nominee
for the U.S. Senate. The Justice Department decided against prosecution and the
Commission, with Thomson abstaining, accepted the recommendation. Id.
178. See also What Abe Beame Did, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1977, at 28, col. 1;
Beame Assails "Vicious Document"; Reactions of Rivals Vary, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27,
1977, at 1, col. 4.
179. FEC Press Release (Apr. 14, 1977).
180. See Weaver, Shapp Told to Return Vote Funds, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1977,
at 1, col. 5; Elections: Shapp Slips, NEWSWEEK, May 23, 1977 at 20; Politics: Shapp
Rapped on Election Funds, S.F. Chron., May 22, 1977, "This World" at 11, col. 1. See
text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
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ing of the discovery. In this instance the evidence was not disclosed until after the campaign, too late to influence the electorate. If the FEC becomes aware of fraudulent practices during
the course of the campaign it has a number of options. It can
initiate proceedings early enough to halt the violations; disclose the violations perhaps affecting the election's outcome; or
rely solely on the post-election remedies such as restitution or
imposition of penalties under the Act. If primary reliance is
placed on this final option, serious political and constitutional
crises may result if the Commission seeks to impose civil or
even criminal penalties on an elected official. 8 '
The Campaign Act and its administrative aspects provides
a new backdrop for political campaigns. This new backdrop is
designed to foster widespread participation in the political process so that the will of the people and not financial backing
plays the decisive role. It becomes important to explore
whether this goal has been achieved.
PART THREE: INITIAL STRATEGY FORMULATIONS

The Federal Election Campaign Act and its amendments
established a new framework for presidential elections. Candidates for major party nominations were confronted in late 1975
and early 1976 with an entirely new calculus of considerations
in developing their campaign strategies. Behind all of these
considerations, however, the basic inquiry still persists: Does
the financial screening process under the new law genuinely
institute a more democratic and equitable system which allows
the candidates who are best qualified and most reflective of the
181. The ability of the FEC to effectively detect violations of the Act will be
hindered by the expansion of public financing to include campaigns for congressional
races. See text accompanying note 15 supra. In a statement before'the U.S. Senate
Committee on Rules and Administration, the Commission offered specific estimates
of the necessary expansion of the staff and support services of the FEC to effectively
administer an expanded public financing system. See FederalElection Reform Proposals of 1977: Hearings on S.1072, S. 926, S. 15, S. 16, S.105, S. 962, S. 966, S.1320, S.
1344 Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 431
(1977) (statement of FEC on S.926, app. D). While the size of appropriations needed
to support such an expansion is relatively modest in proportion to other federal expenditures, the growth of a powerful bureaucracy empowered to oversee the political
process should be undertaken only after careful consideration of the proper role of
governmental regulation of politics.
An amendment to the Campaign Act recently proposed by Congressman Frank
Thompson, Jr. (D-N. J.), chairman of the House Administration Committee, would
limit the Justice Department's ability to prosecute Campaign Act violations to only
those cases where the FEC has itself referred the case. CAMPAIGN PRAcs. REPs., Nov.
28, 1977, at 2.
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national will to move to the fore? This Part examines the factors that candidates and their campaign managers took into
account in formulating their initial strategies under this new
system and the conclusions they reached on the effectiveness
of these strategies. These conclusions, in turn, reveal whether
or not the financial screening process achieved its purpose.
Entry Problems
Timing of entry into the campaign. One of the earliest
effects of the new law was its role in the crucial decision by each
candidate on the proper time to enter the race for the nomination. 82 The strategists for some candidates such as former Governor Jimmy Carter, Senators Bentsen and Jackson, or former
Senator Fred Harris (D-Okla.) recommended entry long in
advance of the first primary in order to secure two important
advantages. First, early entry would enable the candidate to
gradually build a large war chest which could be augmented
later by federal matching funds and additional private contributions. Second, early entry would afford greater exposure to
the public for candidates who were not particularly well known,
thus enabling them to gradually build voter recognition.
For other candidates, however, the entry decision under
the new law created severe problems. The most debated unknown was the amount of time which would be required to raise3
funds.'
the money necessary to qualify for federal matching
This factor played a decisive role in the timing and method of
Senator Frank Church's (D-Idaho) decision to enter the race.
Although he had not formally declared his candidacy, Senator
Church formed a campaign committee in early December of
1975 which filed with the FEC. The committee was certified by
the Commission on February 26, 1976, but the Senator still had
not formally announced his intention to run. A member of his
Senate staff made it clear that Senator Church would have
gieatly preferred to wait until much later to declare, at least
until the conclusion of the activities of the Senate committee
which he chaired:
What he had to consider were the activities of many of his
supporters who were out working for him and the strictures
on them. They could take no pledges without a commitment from us, they couldn't raise money until the papers
182.
183.

See generally J. WITCOVER, supra note 1.
See notes 66-71 and accompanying text supra.
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were filed, and so on. We were concerned that some of
these people might inadvertently cross the line and violate
the law."8 4
The problem of the timing of entry as keyed to the raising of
federal funds created a different dilemma for Senator Birch
Bayh (D-Ind.). At the end of 1975, when the last of the candidates for the Democratic nomination had declared their intentions, there was considerable speculation concerning whether
or not the late entry of Senator Bayh would significantly
impede his ability to quickly qualify for matching funds. It was
often mentioned that significant delay in qualifying might be
interpreted by the press and other observers as a sign of weakness which could damage the image he sought to project as a
candidate with a wide base of support. 85
The new law does give the candidate who enters early a
clear advantage in the early primaries. This result may be attributed to the fact that many of the late-declaring candidates
are compelled to spend much of their time travelling outside
New Hampshire, Maine and Florida where the first primaries
are held in order to raise the $5000 in twenty states necessary
to be certified. The January reports to the FEC revealed that
all of the late-declaring candidates were having definite financial difficulties at the end of 1975,111 while many of those who
had entered early were in good financial shape. The most notable was the campaign of former Georgia Governor Jimmy
Carter who, through December of 1975, had raised $1,213,959
184. Interview with Mike Wetherall, supra note 139. Mr. Wetherall expressed the
opinion of the Church campaign at that time that candidates who enter the race
earliest enjoy a substantial advantage in accumulating money, attracting volunteers,
and qualifying for matching funds. Id.
Moreover, the earlier each of these preliminary activities can be undertaken, the
more time is left for actual campaign activities when the actual race gets under way.
185. A side effect of the pressure to quickly qualify for matching funds may be
the fraudulent chanelling of campaign contributions from one state to another or from
the principal campaign committee itself in order to reach the $5000 minimum in a state
where the candidate's financial support is weak. Allegations that this practice was used
by Governor Shapp's campaign led to an FEC order that he return all of the federal
funds he received for his campaign. Shapp attributed his withdrawal from the race to
his late entry and a consequent inability to become well enough known to generate
support. See Politics: Shapp Rapped on Election Funds, S.F. Chron., May 22, 1977,
"This World," at 11, col. 1.
186. Bayh, Shriver, Udall, Harris and Shapp each ended January, 1976, heavily
in debt, although each was eligible for immediate federal funds from the FEC. Only
Jackson, Wallace and Bentsen, each of whom began their efforts at least a year before
the first primary, were free of financial worries. Thus, while an early start was no
guarantee of successful political results, any start after September of the preceding
year seemed to involve a high certainty of financial difficulties.
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in private funds which had been matched by $547,771.187 The

Carter campaign put the money to profitable long range use
building an effective organization in the early caucus and primary states which elevated their candidate into the position of
88
front runner as early as the Iowa precinct caucuses.' Similarly, Congressman Morris Udall's (D-Ariz.) early declaration
resulted in the building of a successful fundraising effort which
lent credibility to a campaign which in earlier years would have
undoubtedly been dismissed as frivolous.Is

When the results of the 1976 Democratic primaries are
analyzed from the perspective of the impact of the new law,
however, the importance of the timing of the entry of the candidate diminishes. The concerns expressed by strategists for both
Senators Bayh and Church were similar: their entry into the
race was being forced at an inconvenient time due to the requirements of the new law. 10 The political fortunes of each
were nontheless different. Although able to raise the threshold
amounts requisite for matching federal funds,'' Senator
Bayh's campaign collapsed during the early primaries after a
poor showing in Massachusetts.' 92 Although he blamed his
weak performance on his late start, analysts pointed to other
187. 2 FEC RECORD, supra note 67, no. 2, at 6 (1976).
188. See J. WrrcovER, supra note 1, at 225. The early organizing advantage
gained by Carter was solidified by his subsequent primary victory in New Hampshire
on Feb. 25, again attributable to an early start at building an organization and making
extensive personal contacts. However, the image was just as quickly erased by his poor
showing in Massachusetts the following week. It would seem then that this exposes the
one inherent weakness in placing too great a reliance on long range strategy-lack of
staying power. Nevertheless, a strategy similar to Carter's had been utilized in 1972,
when the McGovern campaign was based on building effective organizations in the key
primary states as much as a year in advance. See R. DOUGHERTY, GOODBYE MR. CHRISTIAN: A PERSONAL AccouNT OF McGovERN's RISE AND FALL (1973); G. HART, RIGHT FROM
THE START: A CHRONICLE OF THE McGOVERN CAMPAIGN 51 (1973).
189. Udall explained this advantage of the new law early in the campaign. See
Udall, When Money Talks but Doesn't Shout, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1976, at 37, col. 2.
Generally, the conventional political wisdom had been that members of the House
could not seriously contend for the presidency. This was based on the fact that they
lacked a large constituency and national name recognition. As a result, even Congressman Wilbur Mills (D-Ark.), then one of the single most powerful men in the government as Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee was dismissed as a
candidate when he entered the New Hampshire primary in 1972.
190. See notes 184 & 186 and accompanying text supra.
191. Senator Bayh received $545,710.39 in federal matching funds. FEC Press
Release (Apr. 14, 1977).
192. Senator Bayh received only 5% of the vote in Massachusetts despite repeated campaign appearances and a major effort in the state. N.Y. Times, March 3,
1976, at 1, col. 8.
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more substantive shortcomings.' Senator Bayh had the resources to spend $200,000 on a media campaign in the early
primaries, but chose an anti-Carter, pro-establishment theme
that his own strategists later concluded backfired."' Senator
Church, on the other hand, remained an active and viable candidate even after the actual primaries had ended.' Despite his
late entry, he was able to mount a credible effort in the later
primaries against the substantial Carter momentum.'"
There remains, of course, another route available to candidates seeking to enter the field. Governor Edmund Brown, Jr.
of California drew immediate attention late in the primaries by
announcing his intention to mount a "stop Carter" effort." 7
Since there was doubt whether he could qualify in time for
matching funds, the prospect was raised of a candidate who
would be able to campaign over a short period of time with
private contributions from a coalition of those seeking to block
the nomination of the front runner. Moreover, since expenditure limits may only constitutionally be imposed on candidates
accepting public funds, Governor Brown's decision to use exclusively private money would have created the prospect of one
candidate operating under federal restrictions inapplicable to
another. Although Governor Brown did ultimately request and
accept federal funds,'98 the possibility remains that a situation
193. See, e.g., How the Bayh Race Deteriorated,N.Y. Times, March 4, 1976,
at
18, col. 8. Senator Bayh had finished second in the Iowa precinct caucuses,
third in
New Hampshire, and seventh in Massachusetts. Id.
194. Id. Another analyst, R.W. Apple, suggested that Bayh's inability to continue financing his campaign caused him to withdraw before the primaries
in states
where he might have fared better, such as New York. See Apple, Campaign
Fund
Dictates Tactics, N.Y. Times, March 12, 1976, at 16, col. 3.
195. Senator Church withdrew on June 14, 1976 after the conclusion of the last
primary. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1976, at 27, col. 4.
196. See N.Y. Times, April 20, 1976, at 24 col. 3; N.Y. Times, May 12, 1976,
at
1, col. 8; N.Y. Times, May 29, 1976, at 8, col. 1. Senator Church's prospects
were
temporarily buoyed by his surprise victory in the Nebraska primary. N.Y. Times,
May
13, 1976, at 27, col. 1.
197. An analogue to the late entry of Governor Brown was the last minute attempt to "draft" Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) in a related "stop
Carter"
effort. As with Governor Brown, a considerable number of questions were raised
about
the proper procedures and practical possibilities of such a movement. See text
accompanying notes 342-347 infra.
198. Governor Brown was ultimately certified as eligible to receive matching
funds by the FEC on June 17, 1976, and was at that time authorized to receive
the
$100,000 threshold amount. Letter from FEC Press Office to David Ifshin
(Apr. 14,
1977) [on file at SANTA CLARA L. Rav.]. The loose organizational structure of
his late
starting campaign, however, made it difficult for him to document many contributions
in a manner sufficient to allow verification by the Commission. The use of ticket
sales
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could arise in a future election where two major candidates are
running against each other under totally different rules governing expenditure limits. While there are obvious potential inequities in this alternative, it is also a valuable offset to the
advantage enjoyed by a candidate who initiates campaign
fundraising early.
Thus, there remain numerous strategies available under
the new law, despite its significant changes. Decisions on when
to begin a campaign inevitably involve a balancing of innumerable intangibles, and it is not apparent from the 1976 experience that the new law has unduly handicapped or aided any
class of candidates. On the contrary, one analyst speculated
that one of the most significant results of the new law is that
it will give "basically unknown candidates or candidates with
only regional appeal an opportunity to get started earlier and
compete with the Hubert Humphreys and Ted Kennedys who
dominate the media." He attributed this to the fact that the
availability of federal money will keep such candidates in the
race when previously they never could have raised the start up
money to even become known.'
However, one message of 1976 for candidates in 1980 may
well be that early entry into the race, perhaps as early as two
years in advance of the first primary, carries with it considerable advantages under the new law. Thus, one of the least desirable effects of the new campaign finance reforms might be
to further extend an election period that has already been
°
heavily criticized as too lengthy. 00 Whether the corresponding
advantage of giving a wider range of potential candidates a
chance at the nomination significantly offsets this effect remains to be seen. But there lies beneath this effect a deeper
process-the process by which an individual decides to seek
the nomination in the first place. One of the less visible and
yet most significant effects of the new law may be a profound
for fundraising concerts was a classic example. See Weaver, 14 PresidentialAspirants
Spent $70 Million in Races, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1976, at 1, col. 6. The FEC has
attempted to clarify some of the confusion in this area under its recently promulgated
regulations. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 130.8-.9 (1977).
199. Interview with Warren Weaver, supra note 161.
200. See, e.g., Apple, Primaries: There Must Be a Much Better Way, N.Y.
Times, March 28, 1976, § 4, at 4, col. 3. A nationwide Gallup Poll indicated that 68%
of the voting public would prefer a nationwide presidential primary system. Only 21%
were opposed. S.F. Chron., Feb. 26, 1976, at 16, col. 2. Senator Lloyd Bentsen called
for such a consolidated selection process on his withdrawal from the race. S.F. Chronisupra note 1.
cle, Feb. 11, 1976, at 12, col. 1. See also J. WlTrrcov,
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altering of the initial "screening process" through which candidates weigh their probabilities of election and thereby decide
whether to run for the presidency.
Initial funding. The most frequent and perhaps most serious criticism of the pre-Act methods of financing presidential
campaigns was that it placed too much power in the hands of
a few wealthy individuals and organizations in determining
who was able to run for president.2 ' It was this perception that
was the impetus for much of the public demand for campaign
finance reform.2 02 Similarly, it was the prevention of the corruption inherent in this method of financing that justified the first
amendment intrusions in the new law." 3 It remains an open
question to what extent and to whom this power will shift
under the current methods of campaign finance. The introduction of individual limits on contributions, public money into
the process, and expenditure limits on those who accept such
money will probably reduce the quantity of money involved
and limit the influence of any one individual contributor.10
Nevertheless, the funding of primary campaigns still depends
on the solicitation of private contributions.10 The matching
funds concept requires candidates to show some basis of private support before being eligible to receive public funds.M
This requirement was approved in Buckley.2 07
Thus, an unchanged premise of presidential campaigning
is that potential candidates must assess who will provide the
money. The answer to this queston evolves into a "screening
process" which eliminates many of those who consider candidacy before the first vote is cast. Consequently, to mount a
national campaign for the presidency, an organization must
know who will provide the crucial flow of money.
An examination of the reports filed with the Commission
and discussions with various campaign managers and other
observers reveal that the Campaign Act's finance provisions
may not have drastically altered the candidate's dependence
on a small cadre of contributors. While it is clear that the
201.

See generally H.

ALEXANDER, MONEY POLITICS AND PUBuc REPORTING

Nicholson, Campaign Financing and Equal Protection, 26
(1974).
202. SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, at 4-6.
203. See notes 91-122 and accompanying text supra.
204. But see text accompanying notes 309-323 infra.
205. See text accompanying notes 66-76 supra.
206. SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, at 6-7.
207. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 106 (1976).

STAN.

(1972);

L. Riv. 815, 818
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tawdry spectacle of the idle rich "king maker" has been shifted
slightly off center stage, 0 it has not necessarily been replaced
by a democratic or equitable process. Rather, what appears to
be emerging is a system dependent upon individual contributions of a still substantial amount, well beyond the reach of
most citizens.
One indication of whether a candidate is receiving large
numbers of contributions in excess of $250 is to compare the
ratio of total private money received to money that has been
matched with federal funds. 09 Presumably, that portion of
unmatched money represents money received over the $250
ceiling on matchable contributions.
Of the three Democratic candidates that raised over $2
million by the beginning of 1976, only one, Alabama Governor
George Wallace, was able to aggregate a large campaign treas10
ury through almost entirely matchable contributions. By
February 1976, Wallace had been authorized to receive
2
$2,193,585.38 from the federal government in public money ,'
The other two, Senators Jackson and Bentsen (D-Tex.), were
able to raise comparably large amounts of money, but based on
the above calculus much of this money was apparently given
in relatively large sums. Thus, while Bentsen had been able to
raise $2,110,451 through December 1975, only $511,023 (24.3%)
was matchable.212 Similarly, of Jackson's $3,457,374 only
$906,586 (26.2%) was matched."t 3 Those with lower contribu208. Further, it is not clear exactly how far "off-stage" such "fat-cats" have been
shifted. For example, the Buckley decision led to speculation that the activities of such

individuals would simply re-emerge in the form of "independent expenditures." See,
e.g., NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 1976, at 15-16; TIME, Feb. 9, 1976, at 10-12.
209. Private contributions to a single candidate in the primaries are limited to
$1000 by an individual, Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, § 112(2),
2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1977), and $5000 by a political committee, id. § 441a(2) (A). Contributions by individuals are matchable by federal funds up
to $250. I.R.C. § 9034(a).
210. Governor Wallace was in the unique position, among the presidential candidates, of receiving royalties from the use of his name and likeness on campaign materi-

als. The royalties were held permissible by the FEC. 40 Fed. Reg. 44,040 (1975). The
problem for the Commission was whether to characterize the royalty proceeds as

"contributions" eligible for matching funds, or some other form of receipt of funds by

the campaign. Consequently, the Commission has recommended to Congress that the

Act be amended to prohibit federal candidates from personally profiting from their
campaigns. 1976 FEC REPORT, supra note 42, at 76.
211. Amounts certified as matchable were reported in 2 FEC REcoRD, supra note
67, no. 2, at 7 (1976). Overall contribution figures are from reports filed with the FEC
examined on Dec. 22, 1976.
212. Id. at 6.
213. Id. at 7.
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tion totals, however, had higher ratios of matchable contributions to total contributions. Former Governor Carter's matchable ratio was 45% ($1,213,959 in private contributions of which
$547,771 was matched). Congressman Udall's was 70%
($830,000 in private contributions of which $581,208 was
matched).'" Former Senator Fred Harris' "populist" campaign, however, produced a ratio of only 36.7% ($460,000 in
private contributions of which $168,859 was matched)." 5
It is fair to imply then that most of the 1976 candidates
were still dependent upon relatively large private contributions
in the early "seed money" stage of the campaign." ' In fact,
since contributions of $1000 are at least 25% matchable it
would seem that, even when one allows for possible delays in
the receipt of federal money"7 or unmatchable contributions
from political committees, many of the early campaigns were
fueled by $1000 contributions. A perfunctory examination of
the records on file with the FEC supported this hypothesis."'
Senator Bentsen's list of contributors disclosed a multitude of
$1000 contributors, with few below the maximum permissible
amount. The relatively few contributors, beyond those necessary for initial matching certification, who resided outside the
Senator's home state, reflected his regional popularity. This
factor led to his early withdrawal from the race.21
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Ultimately the average amount of contributions received was lower once the
campaigns had progressed beyond the "seed money" stage. The average contribution
received by all candidates which was submitted for matching funds was $28.86. The
highest average of the major candidates was $43.06 by President Ford and the lowest,
$11.74 by Senator Harris. However, the incidence of larger contributions at the seed
money stage is corroborated by the substantially larger average contributions of candidates who never made it past that stage. Hence, Sanford's average contribution was
the largest ($126.07) followed by Shriver ($104.12) and Bentsen ($84.98). Moreover,
averages are not really indicative of the size of the bulk of a candidate's contributions
since the receipt of ten $5 contributions and one $1000 contribution would still result
in an average of less than $100. 1976 FEC REPORT, supra note 42, at 16.
217. Thirty percent of the reports filed with the FEC in the initial period of the
election were returned as "inadequate" under early requirements of strict compliance
with the reporting provisions of the Campaign Act. 1976 FEC REPORT, supra note 42,
at 21, 32. Ultimately, candidates submitting requests for matching funds had a high
percentage of such requests certified. The lowest percentage was 83.64% by Governor
Brown, and the highest was 99.73% by Sargent Shriver. Id. at 16.
218. Those records on file through December 22, 1975 were examined.
219. Dick Murphy contended that a candidate with a "large handful" of contributors able to give $1000 each enjoys a tremendous advantage over a similar candidate
with a "small handful" of such contributors and many impecunious supporters. Interview with Dick Murphy, supra note 140.
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The voluminous campaign records of Senator Jackson revealed a broader base of popular support than Senator Bentsen's, but this did not necessarily reflect a broader base of
financial support. One of Senator Jackson's principal fundraisers indicated that the source of these funds was the same individuals who had previously contributed heavily to causes in
which they believed.22 Primarily upper middle class, many of
them Jewish, they were not the "fat cats" of enormous bankrolls who attempt to buy personal influence, but rather individuals oriented to giving in order to support a cause, issue or
personality. Many had given equivalent sums22 to other candidates in the past, such as Hubert Humphrey. 1
The most dramatic example of a candidate using the new
funding system to launch a presidential effort was, of course,
the campaign of former Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter. Although the Carter campaign had a high ratio of matchable
funds to overall contributions, 22 he was nonetheless dependent
upon the support of a handful of wealthy contributors in the
earliest "seed money" stages. 22 These contributors represented
a core of backers who had provided funding not only in Carter's
1976 presidential bid, but in his two earlier gubernatorial races
as well.224 Nonetheless, it is unlikely that Carter could have
sustained his effort without the infusion of federal fundsYn 5
Despite the continued reliance by the most successful
fundraising efforts on traditional money sources, the idea
underlying public financing-giving candidates without access
to large amounts of money a chance at the nomination-seems
to have met with moderate success. It is clear that some candidates would not have entered the race without the expectation
of timely infusions of federal money. For example, the Harris
220. Interview with Hershey Gold, fundraiser for Senator Jackson, en route from
San Diego to Los Angeles by airplane. (Aug. 22, 1975).
221. Id.
222. Through April 14, 1977, Carter had been certified by the FEC to receive
$3,726,521.69 in federal matching funds for his primary campaign. This was substantially more than any of his Democratic opponexqts, except Governor Wallace who
received $3,291,308.81. See FEC Press Release (Apr. 14, 1977).
223. See Horrock, Carter Campaign Funds Raised by a Group of Georgia
Lawyers, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1976, at 24, col. 6.
224. Id.
225. See Horrock, Experts Say New Election Fund Law Saved Carterfrom a
Blitz by Rivals, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1976, at 12, col. 3. The Times analysis of the
Carter campaign and the new finance law concluded that Carter was the "principal
beneficiary" of the new law and that it sharply reduced the "built-in advantage" of
candidates with access to more substantial funding sources. Id.
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campaign limped into February in debt and was returned to
bare solvency only by the issuance of a federal subsidy by the
Commission. According to Jim Hightower, the Harris campaign manager, this was all part of the Harris scenario:
The new law makes this campaign possible. For the first
time [in 1976] it will be possible for a candidate to run
independently of the big money, using mainly small contributions of five and ten dollars and federal matching
funds . . . . We aren't going to ever have a bank account
that's very high, but we'll have enough to run and that's a
big change from '72 when Fred [Harris] had to drop out
before he ever got started because there just wasn't enough
money."'
This view was shared by Fred Wertheimer, vice-president
of Common Cause, who observed that the single biggest change
under the new law is that it provides "any serious challenger
an earlier shot," and noted that candidacies such as the Harris
campaign now become possible: "It doesn't give them any
great advantage; there will still be some campaigns like Jackson's or Bentsen's or even Wallace's with lots of money, but it
does allow a Carter or a Harris to start early, get known and
show some strength without a gigantic investment by a few big
backers." 2"
Candidates who had not planned so far in advance, however, contended that the limitations on large contributions in
the early stages unfairly handicapped their efforts to raise
"seed money." Sargent Shriver's campaign manager
contended that Shriver had a potentially broad national base, but
lacked a dedicated core of supporters willing or able to give the
$250 to $1000 sums necessary to reach a larger constituency.2 s
As a consequence, he contended, Shriver had been forced to
spend a good deal of time attending endless small cocktail
parties to keep the languid cash flow open in order to cover
226.

Interview with Jim Hightower, campaign manager for former Senator Fred

Harris (D-Okla.), in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 18, 1975). Former Senator Harris reiter-

ated the strategy when filing his third quarter reports for 1975, which showed only a
$1,000 operating surplus until that point. He noted that the presence of federal funds
which would be available to him at the beginning of 1976 made it practical to stay in
the race. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1975, at 11, col. 1.
227. Interview with Fred Wertheimer, vice-president of Common Cause, in
Washington, D.C. (Dec. 26, 1975).

228. Interview with Dick Murphy, supra note 140. Shriver's matchable contribu-

tions came from only 2,745 people, compared with 58,372 for Jackson or 97,764 for
Udall. 1976 FEC REPORT, supra note 42, at 16.
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basic expenses. Similarly, this effort consumed a substantial
portion of staff time. 2 1
Although conclusions based on one year's experience are
by definition fragile, it would appear that the new law has not
produced a great shift in who gives or receives campaign
money. The primary difference is that the ceiling on individual
contributions will reduce the personal influence of single big
contributors-and shift the emphasis to a slightly wider segment of the population, mainly the upper middle class. While
candidates such as Fred Harris, Jimmy Carter, or Morris Udall
who are willing to begin long in advance and gamble on ultimate success have become more plausible, they will continue
to suffer under a significant money differential between themselves and the candidates who are able to draw on the traditional money sources. The important unanswered question,
which only several elections can resolve, is whether there is
simply a minimum amount of money necessary beyond which
added increments offer no significant advantage. That is, if a
candidate can garner enough funds to run a basic organization
and support minimal media coverage in the early stages, will
that provide him with sufficient exposure to attract the financial backing critical to long run success. If so, then candidates
who previously had no chance of entry will now be able to
muster enough funds to begin a serious campaign.
This new system also has not altered the continuing reality
that the broad mass of people in this country remain disenfranchised in one of the most critical stages of selecting the president and vice-president of the United States. They are disenfranchised by their inability to afford the necessary contributions in the early stages to get a candidate started. Contributions play a critical role in the esoteric and arcane primary and
caucus system that persists in the United States, yet the vast
majority of people in this country cannot afford to participate
in this aspect at all.
Finally, in 1976, even with these new reforms, it would
seem fair to conclude that candidates questioning whether to
run for the nomination were still forced to consider, not their
own qualifications or electability, but rather their ability to
secure the financing needed to withstand the nominating process. Thus, the screening effect of the Act, while an improve229. Interview with Dick Murphy, supra note 140. Shriver ultimately received
$285,069.74 in federal matching funds. FEC Press Release (Apr. 14, 1977).
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ment over earlier elections, leaves much to be desired as a
method for determining which candidates will make the decision to enter the race for the nomination.
Effect on Staying Power
One of the most fundamental unanswered questions about
the impact of the new law is what effect it will have on the
"staying power" of candidates. That is, will candidates who
are
not doing well in other respects nonetheless stay in the race
longer than they otherwise would because of the availability of
federal funds? 30
Former Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, campaign
manager for his brother, Congressman Morris Udall in his
unsuccessful bid for the Democratic presidential nomination,
commented on the importance of this issue at the outset of
the campaign: "The issue may be stated simply: Does the
Federal law keep a candidate in beyond his natural political
viability? If it does, it may re-write the whole book of traditional campaign strategies. 2' 3' The campaign of Henry Jackson

was built on the premise that both the $1000 limit on individual contributions and the availability of matching funds
would give a candidate with strong support in the upper middle class the greatest advantage. Since this was Jackson's
major area of strength, the new campaign law was viewed by
his strategists as a decisive factor in his favor. Robert Keefe,
national political director for Jackson, put it bluntly:
We will start the primaries in February with enough
money in the bank to last us through all of the primaries
right up to the convention in July. We won't be vulnerable
to the crisis that hit the Muskie campaign after Wisconsin
where a couple of poor showings in earlier primaries caused
his money to dry up. Even if things get rough in the early
primaries, we'll have enough money in advance to take us
right through California."'2
The fundraising reports filed with the FEC through January,
1976 bore out Keefe's predictions that his candidate would re230. See I.R.C. § 9033(c)(1). This section, applicable to future elections, eliminates a candidate's eligibility for federal matching funds if he receives less than 10%
of the vote in two consecutive primaries.
231. Interview with Stuart Udall, campaign manager for Congressman Morris
Udall, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 26, 1975).
232. Interview with Robert Keefe, campaign manager for Senator Henry Jackson, in Washington, D.C. (July 12, 1976).
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ceive a large volume of contributions under $1000 early in the
campaign. Up to that point, the campaign had raised 1.6 million dollars.233
Once they achieved this early volume of contributions, the
Jackson strategists contended that the new campaign finance
system would continue to work in their favor for two basic
reasons. First, it was felt that the large reserves of money would
keep the campaign moving, even if Jackson made poor showings in early primaries and the flow of contributions temporarily dried up. Conversely, other candidates who did not fare well
early and did not have Jackson's reserves would be forced to
drop out, giving Jackson the opportunity to make a better
showing in later primaries with a narrowed field of candidates.
Second, Jackson's strategists felt the availability of federal
money would keep some candidates in the race longer, each of
whom would pick up blocs of delegates to the convention. In
this event, Jackson's large reserves would enable him to mount
a cumulatively more effective effort, giving him a plurality that
could only be matched by Governor George Wallace. 4 Jackson
would then be in the best bargaining position to put together
a winning coalition. Thus, two important premises of the Jackson strategy rested on the increased staying power of candidates under the new campaign finance system: first, Jackson
would not be forced out by early mediocre showings, and second, the field would be comparatively larger for a longer period
of time allowing him to win the nomination even if he had only
a plurality of delegates at the end of the primaries.
The results of the Jackson strategy in 1976, indicated to
some extent that federal money added little to the staying
power of a well-known candidate.235 One reason is that such
candidates have the ability to attract large amounts of money
with which to finance their campaigns. Consequently, the additional federal money is not a crucial factor in determining
whether the campaign will continue. Moreover, the election
reforms actually operate as a restraint on a well-known candidate's ability to finance his campaign. In order to receive fed233. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1976, at 30, col. 1.
234. The new rules that placed delegate selection at the congressional district
level further strengthened the Jackson strategy. As Robert Keefe observed: "There
aren't 33 primaries but over 377. We're planning on that basis. The new finance law
comes into play, because we'll target by congressional districts rather than states.
We'll spend money on districts that have higher odds." Interview with Robert Keefe,
supra note 232.
235. See N.Y. Times, May 2, 1976, at 1, col. 5.
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eral funding, the candidate may not receive contributions in
excess of $1000 from an individual."' This is a serious restriction on a candidate with big money backing since in prior years
contributions well over $1000 were not uncommon. Thus, the
new federal law has impaired this advantage of better known
candidates, leaving them dependent on larger numbers of
smaller contributors.
It cannot be overlooked, however, that the ultimate reason
for Senator Jackson's lack of success in 1976, was political; his
lack of success at the polls.23 Nevertheless, his failure in the
primaries also caused a precipitous drop in contributions to his
campaign 38 which Jackson pointed to as the immediate reason
for his withdrawal.2 39 This experience seems to indicate that

federal money alone is not enough to continue the type of campaign that well-known candidates generally operate.
The staying power of some lesser known or marginally financed candidates in the 1976 primaries, however, seemed to
have been signficantly increased by timely infusions of federal
money. The Harris campaign, as noted earlier, provided a
prime example.240 This is undoubtedly due to the fact that
these campaigns, unlike those of their well-known counterparts, traditionally have been plagued by serious financial
problems. The attrition among these candidates is generally
due to inadequate funding and not poor showings in the primaries. The marginally financed campaigns are less influenced
by poor showings in the primaries partly because their expecta236. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, § 112(2), 2 U.S.C.A.
§ 441a(a)(1)(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
237. See Kneeland, The Jackson Campaign: An Exercise in How To Undo It,
N.Y. Times, May 9, 1976, § 5, at 3, col. 2. Mr. Kneeland concluded that the Jackson
campaign failed because he had relied on a long-range "cost-effective" effort to
gather delegates while failing to develop a genuine constituency or dominate a significantly broad segment of the party. His efforts to appear as the "consensus" candidate
left him vulnerable to the Carter challenge for the same image. Id.
238. The Jackson financial crisis was as much a cash flow problem as a lack of
an ability to continue raising funds. See Kneeland, Jackson's Strategy Hampered by
Lack of Federal Subsidy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1976, at 1, col. 4. This was amply

illustrated by the fact that two weeks after his withdrawal, Jackson filed a claim with
the FEC for $330,000 in matching funds, while his debts at that time exceeded his cash

on hand by only $200,000. Thus, part of Jackson's failure may be attributed to the
delay in receipt of federal funds occasioned by Buckley. See note 92 and accompanying
text supra; J. WITCOVER, supra note 1, at 317.

239. Senator Jackson stated: "I lost the Pennsylvania primary, a primary I had
to win if my candidacy would remain viable. . . . I do not have the financial resources
to continue an active campaign. I do not have a personal fortune to enable me to go
further ....
" N.Y. Times, May 2, 1976, at 1, col. 5.
240. See note 226 and accompanying text supra.
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tions are lower and partly because they often characterize their
defeat as the result of inadequate resources. Federal financing
solves this constant financial crisis and as a result, measurably
increases the staying power of the smaller candidates.
To the extent candidates are able to remain in the race and
spend federal money despite poor showings in the primaries,
the process of allowing one candidate to emerge as the standard
bearer of the ideological factions within the party is postponed.
This is critical since a candidate's strategy often centers on
emerging as the representative of an internal segment of opinion as a prelude to inducing potential contributors who have
not yet committed themselves to any candidate. Moreover, it
is generally felt that this emergence will lead volunteer workers
and contributors who have given once to realign themselves
with a new candidate rather than simply losing interest as their
first choice drops out. It is this narrowing of the field to no more
than a few candidates that is the fundamental raison d'etre of
the primaries.
There is an inherent tension between two purposes of primary elections. First, it is desirable that entry into the race be
easy enough to allow a wide field of candidates to present a
significant range of viewpoints and diversity of personality.
Second, once the field has been established, the primaries must
serve the function of narrowing the field based on voter preferences. The financial resources of candidates for the nomination
are a critical element in this latter phase. The 1976 campaign
demonstrated that the Campaign Act is not equipped to balance these competing purposes. As previously noted, the Act's
infusions of federal money inhibits the usual winnowing of candidates. These two functions cannot be harmonized by the Act
alone. Other reforms are needed; specifically, reform of the
primary system. The current system of primaries in thirty-one
states, over the course of four months, without any significant
federal control, is an anomaly under the Campaign Act. Having moved into the area of federal regulation of campaigns,
Congress should not stop short of the development of a coherent, equitable system. In future amendments of the Act, Congress should examine the effects of the system as a complete
entity and give greater consideration to the interaction of a
variety of factors. Adoption of a national or regional primary
would be a first step toward the development of such a comprehensive system which would permit more reasoned consideration of the impact of the availability of federal money on the
nominating process.

SANTA CLARA LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 18

The Campaign Act and its provisions for matching funds
clearly influenced the overall campaign strategy of the candidates with respect to their timing of entry into the race, initial
funding procedures, and staying power. However, overall strategy is only one aspect of a presidential campaign. Equally important is the effect of the Act on the internal workings of a
campaign.
FOUR: THE ALLOCATION OF CAMPAIGN RESOURCES
Campaigns for the presidency are from their earliest stages
multifaceted affairs. Integrating the disparate and often competing components of a campaign into an effective strategy is
the most fundamental task of a campaign manager. Tactical
decisions on the allocation of always limited resources are inevitably a function of the availability of those resources over the
course of a campaign. When resources will be available is often
as critical an issue as whether they will be available at all.
Under the Federal Election Campaign Act and its amendments, the timing of the flow of money into the campaign has
been dramatically changed. Part Four considers the impact of
the Campaign Act on the allocation of resources. Specifically,
it focuses on how the new law affects the candidate's use of his
time; the decision to emphasize campaign organization or to
rely on the media; the use of consultants; the timing of receipt
and expenditure of money; and the fundraising devices used
during the campaign.
PART

Candidate's Time
The amount of time a candidate has available to spend
campaigning is a key element in developing any campaign
strategy. When long range strategies are formulated in the preprimary stages, a fundamental inquiry must be made into
which primary states the campaign wishes to invest its resources, including the candidate's time, and in which states the
candidate's personal presence will have the best effect. There
is a complicated calculus involved in these decisions, including
such factors as how the press will treat a candidate who invests
a great deal of time in a given state yet does not perform well,
the image the candidate seeks to project,"' and the effective241. See Charlton, Udall Takes Some Time Off to Appeal for More Funds, N.Y.
Times, May 10, 1976, at 20, col. 1; Charlton, Udall, Lacking T. V. Funds, Seeking Free
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ness of the local staff in a given primary state.
This calculus has been made even more complicated by
the change in campaign finance procedures and the concomitant increase in demand on the time of the candidate and staff
to pursue fundraising activities. The amount of time that must
be so spent has been reshaped by the threshold requirement
that to be certified as eligible for federal matching money a
candidate must receive $5000 in contributions of $250 or less
in each of at least twenty states."'
For campaigns which begin accumulating large reserves of
money in the years prior to the election, meeting the certification and matching requirements demands no significant
change in strategy." 3 However, for a late entry, the situation
may be much different. A candidate entering the field shortly
before the first primary may be compelled to spend considerable amounts of time raising money in states of no immediate
political significance, in terms of the sequence of primaries, in
order to meet the requirements for matching funds. 44 By comparison, his opponents, who began earlier, will be able to devote more time to the first three primary states. A member of
the campaign staff of Senator Birch Bayh, who traveled with
the Senator, noted the frustrations occasioned by late entry.
Immediately after Senator Bayh entered the race, 4 5 most of
his available campaigning time was devoted to traveling all
over the country qualifying for federal matching money, while
his opponents were concentrating on the two early primaries
in New Hampshire and Massachusetts.24 Bayh's poor showings in these early states ultimately ended his candidacy.
Ed Cubberly, assistant national political director for SarTime on the Air, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1976, at A16, col. 1; Lelyveld, CarterHas A
Headstartin Pennsylvania, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1976, at 30, col. 1. Udall's situation
was exacerbated by delay in certification of matching funds during the hiatus in the
Commission's powers after Buckley and before the passage of the 1976 Amendments.
See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
242. See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
243. The decision to begin fundraising two years before the first primary was a
critical element in the strategy of the ultimate winner of the 1976 Democratic nomination, Jimmy Carter. See text accompanying notes 222-225 supra. The requirement that
a candidate qualify by receiving a minimum amount in 20 states may even have the
beneficial effect of encouraging a candidate to begin building a national constituency
earlier than he otherwise might have.
244. See text accompanying notes 182-200 supra.
245. Bayh entered the race on Oct. 22, 1975.
246. Interview with Al Unger, campaign staff of Senator Birch Bayh, in San
Francisco, Cal. (Nov. 14, 1975).
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gent Shriver, seemed particularly concerned about this problem and saw it as an aspect of the general "seed money" dilemma facing certain candidates.24 Rather than being able to
develop a broader constituency, Cubberly contended Shriver
was being forced to spend an inordinate amount of time aggregating small contributions."' Under the old system, or one with
higher limits on individual contributions in the early "seed
money" stages, a candidate like Shriver with ready access to a
handful of large contributions might secure enough initial
money to get started with "a few phone calls," freeing him to
campaign. Under the current system, Cubberly continued,
Shriver was spending too much of his time "everywhere but
New Hampshire and Massachusetts, the two places he should
'
be now."249
The Campaign Act has also affected the types and numbers of people the candidate comes into contact with during the
process of fundraising. The advantage of a narrow but devoted
constituency enjoyed by the more affluent candidates, such as
Jackson and Bentsen, is partially offset by the need of a candidate dependent on a large volume of smaller contributions to
"reach out" to an expanding range of people. These latter
campaigns are better able to avoid the problem of continually
"preaching to the converted." This problem was
encountered
in the early stages of the Jackson campaign when most of the
candidate's time was spent enhancing his appeal with people
who were already firmly behind him and able to make contributions in the $100 to $1000 range.2 10 The necessity of other
campaigns to devise alternative strategies to reach out to new
supporters in this early stage allowed some candidates to
broaden their constituency while raising funds. Thus, the Harris campaign strategists undertook to send their candidate
cross-country in the early fall, a move which not only helped
Harris reach his qualifying goal in the necessary number of
states but also provided needed media exposure and contact
with new voters. 5' Other campaign managers similarly speculated that they probably were getting their candidates to seg247. Interview with Ed Cubberly, assistant convention manager for the Democratic National Committee, 1972, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 16, 1975).
248. See text accompanying notes 229-230 supra.
249. Interview with Ed Cubberly, supra note 247.
250. Interview with Robert Keefe, supra note 232.
251. Mohr, Harris Encouraged by Iowa Support of Campaign, N.Y. Times, Jan.
8, 1976, at 20, col. 1.
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ments of the voting public that they might not otherwise have
reached until later in the campaign. 5 '
The problem of how to allocate a candidate's time is an
element of one of the fundamental disputes surrounding the
campaign reforms: Does the Act provide an unfair advantage
to incumbents? In Buckley the opponents of the reforms
charged that the Act inordinately favored incumbents by setting contribution limits, which presumably handicap the
lesser-known candidates' ability to publicize themselves. The
Supreme Court rejected this contention, by noting a number
of provisions in the reforms designed to put challengers on a
more equal footing.5 ' The extent of the Act's discrimination
against a certain class of candidates remains unclear. Among
the participants in the 1976 Democratic nominating process
the conclusion was unanimous: Each campaign manager
agreed that the law discriminated most harshly against his own
candidate and worked to the advantage of all his opponents.5
Media v. Organization
A controversy parallel to that surrounding the influence of
campaign finances has persisted over the propriety of the various techniques for promoting candidates for public office. 55
The most significant aspects of this controversy are not the
blatant "dirty tricks" of the Watergate variety, but the manner
in which campaigns are conducted. Traditionally, political
campaigns have relied most heavily on a good organization as
the sine qua non of electoral victory."' While other elements
were important, it was often the ability of the machines to
carry key states that provided the margins of victory in presidential elections.257 More recently, however, the increased mo252. Joseph Duffey, the Democratic nominee for United States Senator from
Connecticut and now Director of the National Endowment for the Humanities,.noted
that despite the support for him by organized labor, his contacts with that group were
really only on a symbolic level, since he was so dependent on other groups for money
and volunteers. Interview with Joseph Duffey in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 21, 1975).
253. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30-33 (1976).
254. See Interview with Dick Murphy, supra note 140; Interview with Mike
Wetherall, supra note 139; Interview with Bill Wise, Senate staff of Senator Birch Bayh
(D-Ind.), in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 22, 1975).
255. See, e.g., J. ABELS, THE DEGENERATION OF OUR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

(1968); R. HIERERT, THE POLITICAL IMAGE MERCHANTS: STRATEGIES IN THE NEW POLITICS
(1971); J. McGINNISS, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968 (1969).
256. See, e.g., A. HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 400-28 (1968); D. SIMPSON,
WINNING ELECTIONS (1972).

257.

See Watergate and Related Activities: Hearings Before the Senate Select
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bility of the American populace and the rapid growth of communications technology has profoundly altered the American
culture."' s Political campaigns were not left untouched: emphasis began to shift away from traditional machine organizations
toward broader mass appeals through the public media. 59 This
shift increased the need for and was facilitated by the existence
of large sums of money available for distribution to the national
campaign itself rather than to lower "grass roots" organizations.
The technique of heavy media emphasis has begun to fall
into disrepute. At a time when political managers and consultants are carefully rethinking the relative advantages of political advertising; the federal campaign laws have imposed limitations on the essential ingredient of media use-money.2 60 The
conclusion being drawn by participants and observers about
this new reality is fairly uniform: during the early stages of the
primaries the use of the media will be sharply curtailed and
there will be a return to the emphasis on effective organization
utilizing unpaid partisans. 6' While this may have been partly
attributable to the successful use of this technique by the 1972
McGovern campaign, there was a clear consensus among most
campaign strategists that the new law left them little alternative. For some campaigns this seriously affected the entire
strategy. Dick Murphy, Shriver's campaign manager, drew the
conclusion during the campaign that:
[The new law has] eliminated any possibility of media for
us . . . . [T]his does not contribute to a meaningful discussion of issues. Without the law there is no question this
campaign would have much more money, and we would
definitely be putting much more emphasis on media. We
would use every extra dime to put [Shriver] on the radio
in many of the key states . . . . There is no question that
Comm. on PresidentialCampaign Activities, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 3980 (1973).
258. See V. PACKARD, A NATION OF STRANGERS (1972).
259. See J. ABELS, supra note 255, at 45-64, 1826. See also F. DurroN, CHANGING
SOURCES OF POWER: AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE 1970s, at 196 (1971); A. HEARD supra
note
256, at 405; S. HESS, THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN: THE SELECTION PROCESS AFTER
WATERGATE 56-75 (1974); V. PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957).
260. Title I of the 1971 Act imposed some regulation of the broadcast industry
and political campaigns. See text accompanying notes 9 & 10 supra.
261. But see Wright, supra note 101, at 1011-12. (the new law will not necessarily
impair the effective use of the media).
Although media use was limited in the early stages, as the campaign progressed
and the field of candidates narrowed it became more widespread. See generally J.
WITCOVER,

supra note 1.
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more into organization now ....
we are definitely putting 262
effort.
media
no
is
There
Similarly, one of Senator Church's strategists noted that
a lot more thought was going into pacing expenditures by state
because of the proliferation of primaries, and that ultimately,
organizational priorities seemed to be taking precedence as the
more effective use of money. But he noted that the decision
would vary from candidate to candidate, and that a more affluent candidate with little initial support in a given primary state
but significant potential to widen his base might lean toward
23
a "media blitz" and completely forego organizational efforts.
This technique was used by Governor Wallace in Massachusetts to counter speculation about his health. Responding to
polls indicating that many potential supporters were reluctant
to vote for him because of such doubts, Governor Wallace relied
on thirty-second spots in the Boston area portraying him as a
vigorous individual, capable of undertaking the strains of the
presidency. 2 4 Elsewhere, Governor Wallace made a similar
media effort, to urge his scattered supporters to attend precinct
caucuses." 5 Wallace received only 18% of the vote in the Massachusetts primary and despite a comparable statewide media
he finished a weak fourth with only 11.64%
appeal in Oklahoma
2 6
1
vote.
of the
Other campaign managers joined in the general consensus
that the new law shifted the emphasis back to traditional organizational efforts. 2 7 Stewart Udall's remarks mirrored the
overall reaction: "Tactically, the most important change
262. Interview with Dick Murphy, supra note 140.
263. Interview with Mike Wetherall, supra note 139.
264. See Kifner, Jackson Beats Wallace, Carter is 4th in Massachusetts, N.Y.
Times, March 3, 1976, at 1, col. 8.
265. Id.
266. Id.; Apple, CarterApparent Winner in Oklahoma Caucuses, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 8, 1976, at 44, col. 1.
267. In shifting the emphasis back to good organization, the new campaign laws
were indirectly responsible for an undesirable phenomenon-the single issue candidate
largely financed by public funds. The campaign of Ellen McCormack provided the
prime example. Using the "right-to-life" organizational lists and contacts, she received
the requisite contributions and was certified to receive matching funds. The basic
purpose of her candidacy was to promote the position of the anti-abortion advocates.
The success of such a tactic by the supporters of any issue, whatever the merits, raises
several concerns. First, it was not the intent of Congress to provide federal funds for
the mere propagandizing of one side of a controversial issue. Second, the potential
availability of public money to such candidates may be expected to lead to unusually
large numbers of candidates in the field which will serve to splinter the vote and
lengthen the time necessary to allow the strongest candidate to emerge.
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[under the new law] is on the allocation of resources and priorities. On the expenditure side, there will be lean campaigns for
everyone. The emphasis will be on organization now [and] no
longer on big splashy media campaigns.

' 26 8

Despite these early projections of increased reliance on
volunteers, however, use of the media increased as the primaries progressed. In Pennsylvania, Carter used his superior financial position over his opponents to purchase television and
radio commercials promoting his candidacy.211 To counter this,
the Udall campaign attempted to maximize their candidate's
exposure through free news coverage and interviews.r7 Even
the financially hard pressed Udall, however, expended $80,000
on media advertising in the Michigan primary, in an effort to
project an image that would contrast with Carter's alleged
vague stand on the issues."'
It would seem premature then, to conclude that the era of
the media candidate is over. While the new law will clearly
contribute substantially to a shift back to greater reliance on
organization, that shift may be traced to other equally important factors such as the failure of earlier media campaigns,
greater voter sophistication about such techniques, and lower
voter turnouts which allow maximum proportional return for
voter turnout drives. Moreover, the declarations by various
campaign managers of their commitment to organization were
made at the early stages of the campaign-a time when money
was low and media was merely so much straw cast to the wind.
As the campaign intensified, the inability of some campaigns
to attract the volunteer support necessary to build effective
organizations in many states tended to push those campaigns
back into reliance on more media. 72

268. Interview with Stewart Udall, supra note 231.
269. Lelyveld, supra note 241.
270. Charlton, Udall Lacking T. V. Funds, supra note 241.
271. Id. Governor Carter's reliance on the media in the late primaries may
represent a general tactical preference rather than an exigency dictated by other
pressures.
In the first month of the campaign in the general election, Carter purchased
$5 million
of broadcast advertising time and spent $330 thousand on production of commercials.
By contrast, then President Ford spent $1.4 million on media during the same
period.
See Weaver, Ford Can Outspend Carterthis Month, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1976,
at 28,
col. 4.
272. It was in this regard that the Buckley decision's striking down of limitations
on individual expenditures had its greatest impact. Purchasing various forms
of media
advertising was a natural outlet for erstwhile large contributors, who were now
limited
to giving no more than $1000 to any single candidate. See Alpern, The New
Money
Rules, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 1976, at 16; Levin, Lifting the Lid on Campaign
Spending,
NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 14, 1976, at 11.
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Use of Campaign Consultants
Another aspect of the controversy surrounding campaigning techniques involves the use of professional campaign consultants, the "hired guns" of the political world. As campaigns
have become more sophisticated and money more abundant,
Washington and many state capitals have spawned a plethora
of firms and associations dedicated to the task of electing candidates to public office. While many consultants assert that
they work only for candidates with whom they share an ideologfrequently criticized as
ical affinity,2 3 their activities have been
274
mercenaries.
unprincipled
those of
The great reduction in available campaign money will
undoubtedly have a drastic effect on the number of political
consultants employed and the scope of their activities. Tom
McCoy, a fundraiser for former Senator Eugene McCarthy
in 1968, and now director of the Washington Information
Associates (WIA), a consulting firm, observed that the new
law, combined with other economic factors, had already resulted in the reduction of the number of political consultants
in Washington."'5
Other observers shared this view. Warren Weaver of the
New York Times felt it was clear that the new law would make
it "very difficult for consultants," since "no one would be able
2
Similarly, Fred Wertheito afford their steep fees anymore.
mer, vice-president of Common Cause, saw the consultants as
being "very surprised" by the new law and consequently "very
'
much against it."277
Some consulting firms, such as the WIA, are meeting the
problem by diversifying their operations and offering similar
services (e.g., fundraising, opinion research) to other nonpolitical clients, such as charities or private industry. WIA has developed a hybrid service which assists corporations in setting
27
up and effectively administering political action committees.
Other firms are shifting their campaign services from traditional consulting activities such as targeting precincts and analyzing data to, perhaps somewhat ironically, advising on how
273.
274.
275.
ciates, in
276.
277.
278.

J. NAPOLITAN, THE ELECTION GAME AND How To WIN IT 1-5 (1972).
Id. at 1.
Interview with Tom McCoy, Director of the Washington Information AssoWashington, D.C. (Dec. 24, 1975).
Interview with Warren Weaver, supra note 161.
Interview with Fred Wertheimer, supra note 227.
Interview with Tom McCoy, supra note 275.
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to comply with the administrative requirements of the campaign laws, which many opposed so bitterly. One consulting
firm now calls its staff "finance consultants" and advertises
"both fundraising counsel and finance management" to
enable
its clients to take maximum advantage of the new law.27'
Partly
because of this new area for specialization, not everyone
is
convinced that consultants will fare poorly under the new
law.
Anne Wexler, currently Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce,
noted:
It's a much riskier proposition for them, but they're probably going to do just as well. They'll start putting on financial people who perform accounting functions ....
They'll computerize the operation. They'll become the
campaign treasurers. Things have gotten so technical, the
consultants have got more mystique than ever since
they're the ones who understand how to target, how to
break down precincts, how to use polls. I think they're
doing well because campaigns have become so sophisticated, especially with this new law, that they're the only
ones that know what they're doing.280
A post-1976 campaign study on the role of independent
individuals and organizations in the election concluded
that
the new law had shifted influence from wealthy contributors
to
those best able to solicit a large number of small contribu2
tions.

8

Professional fundraising consultants who are able
to

develop programs which will garner large amounts of
money
from small contributors may become the primary beneficiaries
of the changes wrought in campaigning techniques under
the
new law.
Parts Three and Four of this article closely scrutinized the
profound effects of the Campaign Act on the campaigns
themselves, focusing specifically on the overall election strategy
and
the internal allocation of resources. However, examining
the
effects of the new law on the campaigns themselves tells
only
half the story. The full picture is completed with a look
at the
effects of the reforms on the organizations and individuals
who
participate in the political process independent of the individual campaigns.
279. EDWARD A. GREFE ASSOCIATES, INC. POLmCI
ING YOUR CAMPAIGN AND THE NEW LAw (1975).

FINANCE CONSULTANTS, FINANC-

280. Interview with Anne Wexler, current Deputy Under
Secretary of Commerce, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 21, 1975).
281. Malbin, supra note 134.
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PART FIVE: POLITICAL ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED INDEPENDENTLY OF
CAMPAIGNS

Campaign reform is meaningless if the only result is that
activities deemed illegal or subject to disclosure if done directly
by a campaign organization are merely shifted to parallel organizations or individuals not subject to similar legal sanctions. The need for regulation of all the major influences on the
electoral process, however, is limited by first amendment protections of free speech and association. The Supreme Court in
Buckley generally upheld the first amendment intrusions of the
contribution limits as sufficiently justified by the strong gov2
ernmental interest in preventing corruption in elections,, but
invalidated those elements of the law which restricted the right
of individuals to make expenditures independent of such campaigns." 3
One consequence of the new law, particularly after
Buckley, will be the strengthening of the importance of those
organizations and individuals capable of mobilizing volunteers,
making substantial expenditures relevant to but independent
of a campaign, or establishing and controlling political action
committees.
Labor Unions, Corporationsand PoliticalAction Committees
The 1971 Act and 1974 Amendments altered the fundamental ground rules for political activity by corporations and
unions.2

4

Direct contributions to federal candidates by either

282. See text accompanying notes 93-97 supra.
283. See text accompanying notes 98-112 supra.
284. Corporations were first prohibited from making contributions to political
campaigns in 1907. Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (amended 1925). The
1907 Act was later amended by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit.
HII,43 Stat. 1070 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, U.S.C. (1970)) (repealed 1972).
Prompted by the passage of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Labor Management
Relations Act, Congress in 1947 extended the corporate ban to unions. 18 U.S.C. § 610
(Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976). Unions, however, were able to avoid the restrictions
by making contributions and expenditures from separate segregated ("voluntary")
funds designated by members. See Lane, Analysis of the Federal Law Governing
Political Expenditures by Labor Unions, 9 LAa. L.J. 725, 729-31 (1958). For the legislative and judicial history of 18 U.S.C. § 610, see Cohan, Of Politics Pipefitters, and
Section 610: Union Political Contributions in Modern Context, 51 TEX. L. Rav. 936
(1973); Mager, Past and Present Attempts by Congress and the Courts to Regulate
Corporateand Union Campaign Contributions and Expenditures in the Election of
Federal Officials, 1976 S. ILL. L.J. 338. While unions have found a variety of ways of
operating under § 610, recent investigations revealed knowing violations of the law by
many corporations. See THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMII'rEE ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AcrIvrrIES OF THE U.S. SENATE 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The Committee uncovered 13 illegal corporate contributions in 1972 totalling over $780,000, of

56
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are flatly prohibited,"' but unions are allowed to spend unlimited amounts advocating a candidate's election among their
own members."6 Corporations are similarly permitted to spend
unlimited amounts communicating with their administrative
personnel and their stockholders."' Under the 1976 Amendments, however, both must file reports with the FEC disclosing
such expenditures if the total exceeds $2000 per election."'
Moreover, both may spend unlimited amounts on nonpartisan
efforts such as voter registration or get-out-the-vote drives."'
Such expenditures may be directed at the general public and
need not be reported. Both may also spend unlimited amounts
advocating the election of a candidate through communications directed at the general public, but such funds must come
from a voluntary segregated fund rather than through union
dues and must be reported to the FEC. 20
In addition to permitting limited direct efforts by corpora29
tions and unions, ' the Campaign Act allowed the establish-

ment of multicandidate political committees, or PAC's as they
have come to be known (the acronym denoting "political action
committee").212 Such multicandidate committees may contribute up to $5000 to a candidate per election,23 provided
which 12 contributions totalling over $749,000 were made to the Committee
to Reelect the President. Id. at 446. See Lamber, CorporatePoliticalSpending and
Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033 (1965); Comment, The Constitutionality
of the
Federal Ban on Corporate Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CI. L. REv.
148
(1974).
285. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, § 101(e)(1), 18 U.S.C.
§ 610 (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976; reenacted in 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (West Cum.
Supp.
1977)).
286. Id. (repealed 1976; reenacted in 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(2) (A) (West Cum.
Supp. 1977)).
287. Id.; id. (repealed 1976; reenacted in 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(f)(4)(C) (West Cum.
Supp. 1977)). See generally PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, THE CORPORATION IN POLITICS:

THE POLITICAL ACTION COMMI'ITEE, PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES, REPORTING
AND COMPLIANCE

(1976).
288. Expenditures in excess of $2000 must be reported. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, § 102(f)(1), 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(f)(4)(C) (West
Cum.
Supp. 1977).
289. Id. § 441b(b).(2)(B); Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,
§ 201(a)(5), 2 U.S.C. § 431(f)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
290. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, § 112(2), 2 U.S.C.A:
§ 441b(2)(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
291. There remain serious constitutional questions about the regulation of political activity by unions and corporations even after Buckley. See Clagett & Bolton,
supra
note 88, at 1371-73.
292. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, §§ 302-303, 2 U.S.C. §§ 432-433
(Supp. 11 1972) (amended 1974, 1976).
293. Election refers to either a primary, general, special or run-off election.
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they contribute to at least five or more candidates for federal
office in a single year and receive contributions from more
than fifty persons.29'
In the early stages of the 1976 presidential election, concern was expressed that the new law would permit undue corporate influence on the political process.29 The controversy was
fanned by the FEC's Advisory Opinion 1975-23, which defined
the ground rules for corporations deciding to establish their
own political action committees. The opinion was requested by
Sun Oil and the issue before the Commission was whether
a corporate political action committee could use its treasury
funds to solicit contributions from its employees. Ruling
against the recommendation of its staff, the FEC held, 4-2, that
it could.
Organized labor reacted sharply to this advisory opinion,296
and the 1976 Amendments revised the ruling to limit the number of solicitations a corporate or labor committee could direct
to employees to two per year. 7 The amendments also made it
illegal for a PAC to use employer or union contributions which
have been solicited through the threat or use of "physical force,
job discrimination, [or] financial reprisals."2 8
Reports filed with the FEC, however, indicate that in 1976,
it was organized labor rather than business that was able to
Id. § 431(a)(1). Five thousand dollars may be given to a candidate for each election.
Federal Election Campaign Amendments of 1976, § 112(2), 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(2)
(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1977). For presidential candidates, all of the primaries are
treated as one election. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, § 301(a)(3)-(4), 2
U.S.C. § 431(a)(3)-(4) (Supp. V 1975).
294. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, § 112(2), 2 U.S.C.A.
§ 441a(a)(2)(A), (4) (West Cum. Supp. 1977). Political committees must also have
been registered with the FEC for at least 6 months before making such contributions.
Id. The requirement that donations be made to at least 5 federal candidates is essentially meaningless since there is no minimum amount of each contribution. Hence,
committees could contribute $1 to each of 4 candidates and then be free to give $5000
to 1 candidate.
295. See Jensen, G.E.'s Campaign Chest: Two Committees Funnel Executive
Contributions to Selected Committees, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1976, § 5, at 3, col. 2;
Weaver, . . . Meanwhile New Business, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1976, § 4 at 3, col. 2.
296. In an interview conducted shortly after the Sun Oil decision, Bill Dodds,
political director of the United Auto Workers, argued that the opinion did not reflect
the legislative intent of the Act and thus would be challenged both in the courts and
Congress. Interview with Bill Dodds, supra note 163.
2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(4)(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1977). See H. CONF. REP.
297.
No. 1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, 59-60, reprinted in, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws, 946, 974-76 [hereinafter cited without parallel citation as HousE CONFERENCE
REPORT].

298.

2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(3)(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1977). See HOUSE

ENCE REPORT,

supra note 297, at 63-64.

CONFER-
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operate most effectively under the new law. Despite the relaxed
constraints on political activities by corporations, 9 9 their actual performance was totally overshadowed by the operations
of unions.'"" Although unions contributed about half the money
given through PAC's in 1976,1"' their significant activity was
carried on through such "non-partisan" activities as voter registration and voter participation drives.02 According to a postelection study, labor directly expended $8.5 million on behalf
of the Carter-Mondale ticket in the general election, with additional unreported expenditures raising the total to over $11
million313
By contrast, business had little impact on the presidential
election2 °1 The two candidates who ultimately received the
nomination of the two major parties each received only around
$100,000 from business PAC's during the primaries,0 despite
early organizational efforts to establish such groups." 6 Al299. Former President Ford was the early beneficiary of this new corporate
right.
Through May, 1976, his campaign received $65,200 in contributions from PAC's,
compared with $13,600 given to his principal primary opponent, former California
Governor Ronald Reagan. By contrast, Carter received $16,800 in corporate political
committee contributions, almost all of it in April when he had emerged as the front
runner.
Weaver, Companies Aid Ford, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1976, at 1, col. 7.
300. See Malbin, supra note 134; Raskin, The Labor Scene-COPE'sImpact
on
Election Outcome, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1976, § 4, at 1, col. 2.
301. See Unions and Doctors are Ahead in Group Campaign Donations,
N.Y.
Times, Oct. 23, 1976, at 13, col. 1.
302. Such activities are specifically exempted from contribution and expenditure limits by the Act. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(2)(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
The
political arms of the AFL-CIO and the United Auto Workers were estimated
to have
spent $3 million each on such efforts in 1976. See Malbin, supra note 134.
303. Malbin, supra note 134. Malbin concluded that this amount was of
even
greater proportionate significance than all of the large individual contributions
combined in earlier elections because of the spending and contribution limits in
the new
law. Id.
The influence large labor contributions have on elected officials has been heavily
criticized. See Political Action and Education, Wall St. J., May 16, 1977, at
16, col.
1. Despite organized labor's dominant role in the 1976 elections, it has so far
been unable to convert electoral power into legislative victory. Although 71.3% of
AFL-CIO
endorsed candidates were victorious in 1976, its early efforts in Congress to enact
prolabor legislation were firmly rejected. See Hyatt, Labor Striking Out on Capital
Hill,
Wall St. J., June 2, 1977, at 12, col. 4.
304. See Business Missed a Bet on the Election, Wall St. J., Apr. 28, 1977,
at
20, col. 3.
305. Id.
The Ford campaign spent $13.3 million during the primaries while the Carter
campaign spent about $12 million. Total campaign expenditures by all candidates
in
the primaries were about $70 million, including approximately $24 million
of federal
subsidies. See Weaver, supra note 198.
306. The United States Chamber of Commerce and the National Association
of
Manufacturers launched vigorous campaigns to induce corporations to organize
corpo-
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0
though a large number of corporate PAC's were created,1 08no
coherent political strategy comparable to labor's emerged.
It is probably premature, however, to conclude on the
basis of the 1976 experience that the labor-business imbalance
is inevitable under the new campaign laws. The uncertainty of
the permissible scope of political operation under the new system coupled with the evelation of the illegal activities of many
corporations in the 1972 election may have had a chilling effect
on the 1976 activities of business that will be less profound in
1980.

Independent Expenditures
The 1974 Amendments prohibited expenditures "relative
to a clearly identified candidate" in excess of $1000 in a calendar year. 09 After the Supreme Court held in Buckley that restrictions on independent expenditures were unconstitutional, 310 concern was expressed that a loophole had teen created which would permit the continued influence of wealthy
"1
individuals on the electoral process. The parallel holding that
candidates could not be limited in the amount of personal resources they contributed to their own campaigns created similar fears.1
The role of independent expenditures reported in the 1976
campaign, however, proved to be minimal. Total independent
Of
expenditures relative to all candidates were only $373,993.13
rate PAC's. See Jensen, The New Corporate Presence in Politics-The Rush is on to
Develop to In-House Soliciting Units, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1975, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
307. There were 675 business PAC's operating in 1976. Malbin, supra note 134,
at 416. There was a total of 836 committees from business, medical, legal and agricultural groups compared with 253 from labor. Seventy-seven other committees brought
the total number of PAC's active in 1976 to 1,166. Id.
308. Malbin concluded that there may be structural reasons inherent in the
business community and the nature of their interests that will always block the emergence of a co-ordinated political strategy promoting the interests of business. Id. at 412,
415.
309. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976; reenacted in part in 2
U.S.C.A. § 441a (West Cum. Supp. 1977)). Section 608(e) was found to be unconstitutional in Buckley.
310. See text accompanying notes 98-112 supra.
311. See Lydon, Democrats in Bay State Seek to Lure Humphrey, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 2, 1976, at 17, col. 1. See also CAMPAIGN PRACS. REps., Dec. 12, 1977, at 8.
312. Nelson Rockefeller, then Vice-President, suggested after Buckley that
wealthy candidates had always enjoyed an advantage in the public eye in that they
were perceived as less susceptible to improper influence. Id.
313. FEC REcORD, supra note 67, no. 5, at 5. This figure may not accurately
reflect actual expenditures since many independent expenditures which should
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that amount, $364,823 was spent in support of forty-three federal candidates while $9170 was spent opposing two of them.",
Moreover, $267,686 of that amount was spent relative to presidential candidates."' Eighty-three percent of the money was
spent on behalf of Reagan and Ford, with the remaining 17%
expended in support of seven Democratic candidates." ' However, the 1976 figures may not be a reliable indicator of future
independent activity as the Campaign Act becomes better understood and new situations arise which make independent
expenditures tactically effective. Such a situation potentially
arose in 1976 when Governor Brown's late entry into the race
prompted one traditionally large campaign contributor to consider mounting an independent effort on behalf of Jimmy
31 7
Carter in California.
One restraint on independent expenditures may have been
the decision in Buckley upholding the constitutionality of a
requirement that individuals who spend in excess of $100
"other than by contributions to a political committee or candidate" file reports with the FEC disclosing such expenditures. 318
have been reported were not. This resulted from a general unawareness of the need to
file. See Interview with Susan Tifft, assistant press director, FEC, in Washington, D.C.
(Nov. 1, 1977).
314. FEC RECORD, supra note 67, no. 5, at 5.
315. Id.
316. The FEC released the following compilation of independent expenditures on
March 23, 1977 based on an index it had compiled of reports filed with it pursuant to
the Act:
Independent Expenditures for Presidential Candidates
Candidate

Amount Spent

% of Total

Ronald Reagan ............ $115,957 ..................
43%
Gerald Ford ............... $108,214 ...................
40%
Frank Church ............. $ 24,212 ..................
9%
Jimmy Carter .............
$ 17,091" ..................
6%
Morris Udall .............. $
675 ..................
1 %
Jerry Brown .............. $
630 ..................
1%
M ilton Shapp ..............$
448 ..................
.
George W allace ............
$
445 ..................
.
H enry Jackson ............ $
14 ..................
.
TOTAL ................... $267,686 ................
100%
*Figures do not include expenditures made in opposition to the
candidate: $650 made in opposition to Gerald Ford and $8,520
made in opposition to Jimmy Carter.
Id.

317. Brown's late entry raised other problems. See text accompanying notes 197
& 198 supra; N.Y. Times, May 14, 1976, § 1, at 14, col. 7.
318. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, § 304, 2 U.S.C. § 434(c) (Supp.
V 1975).
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Compliance with this requirement may have deterred some
individuals, 3 9 particularly since collaboration with the campaign sought to be helped would have destroyed the independent character of the expenditure. 30 The Commission has recommended that the $100 threshold for reporting of indepen32'
dent expenditures be raised to $250 to alleviate this burden.
Encouraging increased independent expenditures, however,
may not necessarily be a desirable goal. Money spent by individuals who are not connected with the campaign and who are
prohibited from acting "in concert" with it most likely will be
spent on some form of paid advertising. If the purpose of the
Act is to democratize participation in the political process, the
money would be better directed to activities that promote citizen participation. Thus, allowing independent money to be
channelled into other organizational efforts would be more desirable. One proposal, recommended by the FEC to Congress,
is to relax the limitations on expenditures by state parties in
support of presidential candidates and to remove them entirely
from local parties where the expenditures are made in connection with activities normally associated with volunteer efforts. 32 Similar exemptions for other organizational efforts
might contribute to greater citizen activity in campaigns and
provide constructive outlets for independent money.
The removal of restrictions on the use of a candidate's own
personal funds in his campaign had no appreciable impact on
the presidential primary, primarily because none of the candidates for the Democratic nomination in 1976 had sizable personal fortunes. On the contrary, fear of personal debt was a
34
factor offered by both Udall" 3 and Jackson as a reason for
refusing to borrow heavily to sustain their campaign efforts.
Persons Seeking Election as Delegates
The presidential primary system is administered sepa319. See Clagett & Bolton, supra note 88, at 1360-64. The 1976 Amendments
tightened these restrictions even more, including the addition of a requirement that a
notarized statement be filed with the FEC attesting to the truly independent character
of the expenditure. See text accompanying note 126 supra.
320. 11 C.F.R. § 109.1(a) (1977); 41 Fed. Reg. 35,947 (1976).
321. 1976 FEC REPoRT, supra note 42, at 67.
322. Id. at 71-72.
323. An offer by Angelo Geocaris, a wealthy Illinois contributor, to loan Udall
the funds against future federal subsidies was declined because of Udall's reluctance
to personally encumber himself. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1976, at 21, col. 2.
324. Kneeland, Jackson is Out-Senator Ends "Active" Role as Contender for
Nomination, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
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rately by each state.3 25 As with the electoral college, citizens
vote not only for a candidate but usually for persons seeking

election as delegates to the national convention.2 1 State laws

and state party rules vary widely as to the method of selection
of delegates, the independence of candidates for delegate from
the presidential candidates they support, and their freedom of
action as convention delegates if elected.2 1 In states which continue to utilize the precinct caucus system, 32 8 campaigns may
expend almost as much effort promoting the selection of certain individual delegates as they do the presidential candidate
32
directly. 1
The FEC recognized the potential loophole that existed in
the Campaign Act created by this multipurpose function of
primary elections. Presidential campaigns could evade expenditure restrictions by encouraging would-be contributors to give
their donations in support of persons running as delegates who
are committed to their candidate's election. Advertisements
ostensibly uging the election of X as delegate to the convention
could simultaneously promote the nomination of candidate Y
as the nominee. On September 23, 1975 the Commission issued
Advisory Opinion 1975-12 which held that since persons running for delegate are not "candidates" for federal office within
the Campaign Act, 330 their expenditures are not limited by it.
The Commission ruled, therefore, that any restriction on their
325.

See D.

MATTHEWS, PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS: PROCESS AND OUTCOMES
IN

CHOOSING THE PRESIDENT 35, 37 (1974); Note, PresidentialNominating
Convention:

Party Rules, State Law, and the Constitution, 62 GEo. L.J. 1621, 1624-36
(1974)
[hereinafter cited as Nominating Conventions]; Note, Adjudicating National
Convention Delegate Selection Disputes: Prospectsfor Development of Democratic
Party
Law, 7 Loy. CHI. L.J. 374, 378-82 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Delegate Convention].
326. J. ABELS, supra note 255, at 97.
327. Nominating Conventions, supra note 325, at 388-90; Delegate Convention,
supra note 325, at 1638-40. See generally Kester, ConstitutionalRestrictions on
Political Parties,60 VA. L. REv. 735 (1974).
328. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 1.
329. Precinct caucus states normally elect delegates to successively higher levels
of the party structure up to the national level. These elections provide various
candidates with a certain number of delegates through a fixed number of ballots at the
party
convention. Beyond these initial ballots, the personal loyalty of the delegate
to a
candidate is critical. Even in states using primary elections where voters cast
their
ballots directly for a candidate, he is not always assured that the delegate who
will be
sent is necessarily his partisan. For example, prior to Senator Humphrey's disavowal
of candidacy, see text accompanying note 347 infra, there was considerable speculation
as to how many delegates formally committed to still active candidates were
in fact
"subterranean" Humphrey supporters. See Carroll, "Efforts"
for Humphrey Aig
Factor in New York, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1976, at 20, col. 4.
330. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 431(b) (Supp.
V
1975) (defining candidate).
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expenditures is to be determined by the candidate-fordelegate's "status with regard to, or relationship with, a clearly
identified candidate for President.""'' The Commission then
divided the delegates into three categories. In the first such
category were delegates specifically authorized by a presidential candidate. Such delegates were labeled "authorized" and
their expenditures attributed to the authorizing candidate. In
the second category were "pledged but unauthorized" delegates. These were delegates who had announced their support
for a presidential candidate but had not been authorized by
that candidate. Delegates in this category were barred from
expending more than $1000 in their efforts for election, since
such expenditures were considered to be "independent expenditures relative to a clearly identified candidate.

'332

In other

words, the expenditures made by these delegates in promoting
their own election were treated the same as if they had been
made on behalf of the candidate directly. In the final category
were "unauthorized and unpledged" candidates for delegate.
They were subject to no direct limitations, although the FEC
warned that it would look closely at the validity of their denials
3
of commitment to a particular candidate.
However, after Buckley invalidated the limitations on independent expenditures by individuals and permitted unlimited contributions by a candidate to his own campaign, the
soundness of these rules limiting delegate expenditures was in
doubt. As a result, on February 10, 1976 the FEC offered a new
34
comprehensive statement on the delegate selection process.
This statement classified delegates into two categories"authorized" and "unauthorized." Generally, expenses incurred and contributions received by authorized delegates
are attributed to the authorizing presidential candidate's
principal campaign committee. Conversely, the unauthorized
delegates are restrained only by the fact that contributions to
a contributor's aggregate limit of $25,000
them count against
335
in a single year.
331.

40 Fed. Reg. 55,596 (1975).

332.

Id.

333. Id.
FEC
334. 2 FEC RECORD, supra note 67, no. 3 (1976) (Special Supp.). The
down
handed
Court
Supreme
the
after
days
10
approved this policy statement

Buckley and before it was restructured by the 1976 Amendments.
335. 3 FEC RECORD, supra note 67, no. 5, at 5. Individuals running for convention
delegate classified as unauthorized by any presidential candidate expended $227,167
supporting or opposing identified federal candidates. Id. at 5. This figure does not
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The restrictions on delegates are a reasonable extension of
the law and essential to preventing its wholesale evasion. An
unfortunate byproduct, however, is that the rules may undermine other efforts to open the delegate selection procedure to
greater public participation. The Democratic Party established
two commissions to further the democratization of the delegate
selection process. Both the McGovern-Fraser Commission33
and the Mikulski Commission"' 7 attempted to open up this
process and free it of backroom control. 3 8 As a consequence of

these reforms of the selection process, election as a delegate to
a national nominating convention is becoming a position of
bona fide responsibility and representation,339 rather than simply an honorary appointment to a cheerleading section. 40 Restrictions imposed on the financing of delegate campaigns
could operate to make candidates for delegate even more dependent on presidential campaigns, thereby defeating efforts to
develop a convention of representatives who are reflective of
local party opinion. The FEC should be cautious that, in further defining the methods by which delegates may campaign,
it does not intrude upon the vital party reforms instituted in
the last ten years. The Commission has recognized the need for
further legislation in this area and has recommended to Congress that certain amendments be made to the Act in this
include total expenditures by candidates for delegate or expenditures not clearly identifying a candidate. Id.
A recently proposed amendment to the Campaign Act would exempt from limitation contributions to convention delegate candidates. CAMPAIGN PRAcs. REPs., Nov. 28,
1977, at 3.
336. The McGovern-Fraser Commission was established pursuant to a resolution
of the 1968 Democratic National Convention and was charged with the task of revising
delegate selection procedures. COMMISSION ON PARTY STRUCTrE AND DELEGATE SELECTION, MANDATE FOR REFORM 9-15 (1970).
337. The Mikulski Commission was established pursuant to a resolution of the
1972 Democratic National Convention. COMMITrEE ON RULES, 1972 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, BY THE PEOPLE: REPORT TO THE CONVENTION

§ 6 (1972).

338. See Abzug, Segal & Kalber, Women in the Democratic Party:A Review of
Affirmative Action, 6 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. Rv. 1 (1974). See also Delegate Convention, supra note 325; Nominating Conventions, supra note 325.
339. See, e.g., J. ABELS, supra note 255, at 77-78.
340. Joseph Gebheardt, who was a staff member of the McGovern-Fraser Commission, a delegate to the Charter Convention in 1974 and a delegate to the 1976
Democratic National Convention observed: "At the Charter Convention . . . it was
clear that there is a growing number of independent party people who are taking the
role of delegate very seriously and who are seeing it as an important function that
extends well beyond a few days in the summer once every four years." Interview with
Joseph Gebheardt, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 29, 1975). See also Seven of the Democratic Delegate Candidates: Why They Run, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1976, at 27, col. 2.
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regard.34 ' Specifically, the Commission recommended exemption of costs to delegates in attending conventions and party
meetings from the definitions of "contributions" and "expenditures," statutory division of "authorized" and "unauthorized" candidates for delegate, and reporting of contributions
and expenditures by candidates for delegate in excess of $1000,
rather than the current $100.142
Draft Committees
Traditionally, there have been a number of potential candidates for political office who were unsure of their support and
hence reluctant to launch a campaign. In the past, they were
able to test political sentiment by observing reactions to committees formed to "draft" them into candidacy. In other instances, citizens organized themselves into such committees in
an attempt to persuade a genuinely reluctant individual to run
for an office by demonstrating potential support. An important
unanswered question about independent activities under the
new law is the future of such draft committees.
In 1976, the issue was briefly raised by the recurrent speculation surrounding the intentions of Senator Hubert Humphrey. In December of 1975, a "Committee to Draft Senator
Humphrey" filed with the FEC. Shortly thereafter, Senator
Humphrey filed a letter with the FEC disavowing any connecfor the committee and asking them to
tion with or support
343
cease operations.
These efforts to organize the "draft Humphrey" committee, led by Representative Paul Simon (D-Ill.), were abandoned after the FEC notified the organizers that they might be
"
subject to the $1000 ceiling on independent expenditures.
However, the ruling in Buckley that limitations on expenditures by individuals acting independently were unconstitutional3 5 opened the door to the formation of draft committees,
provided they do not act in concert with the candidate whose
nomination they are urging. Thus, the inconclusive early 1976
341. 1976 FEC REPORT, supra note 42, at 68.
342. Id.
343. Interview with David Fiske, supra note 172. Professor Fleishman anticiat
pated this problem of the anti-candidate committee. See Fleishman, supra note 37,
881.
344. Weaver, Humphrey Draft May Be Renewed, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1976, at
1, col. 4.
345. See text accompanying notes 99-112 supra.
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Democratic primaries revived attempts to draft Senator Humphrey.346 Carter's victory in Pennsylvania eventually led Senator Humphrey to renounce any possible candidacy, 4 ' but the
efforts on his behalf illustrated the problems that can arise.
The primary problem generated by these efforts involved
the uncertainty over the time when independent committee
activity ended and a campaign began. In its 1976 annual report, the Commission noted the potential loopholes in this area
and recommended that Congress take action to close them.
The Commission observed that the current statutory language
requiring reports by candidates, individuals making independent expenditures on behalf of a clearly identified candidate,
and political committees supporting a clearly identified candidate probably imposed no reporting requirement or expenditure limitation on draft movements. 48 The Commission also
observed that under current law an individual could contribute
up to $5000 to a draft committee while being limited to $1000
in aggregate contributions to a declared candidate's campaign.
Moreover, it noted that if the draft candidate later entered the
race, there was nothing to prevent an individual who had already contributed $5000 to the draft committee from contributing an additional $1000 to the campaign itself.34 To rectify this
situation, the FEC recommended that a $1000 limit be placed
on contributions to draft committees, and that these contributions be applied against an individual's $1000 aggregate contribution limit should the candidate later declare, if they were
made "with the knowledge that a substantial portion" of the
contribution would be expended on behalf of that candidate. 50
The difficulty with the Commission's recommendations is
that a candidate who genuinely discouraged the formation of a
draft committee might later be penalized for its activities. It
would seem unfair to attribute to a popular senator or governor
the acts of those he had not authorized and over whom he had
no control. While the Commission's proposal only imposes a
burden on the contributor by preventing a later contribution to
the candidate's campaign committee in excess of the $1000
346. See J. WrrcovzR, supra note 1, at 311-16. See also Weaver, supra note 344;
Carroll, supra note 329; Carroll, Jackson Optimistic as He Seeks to Build State
Coalition, N.Y. Times, March 16, 1976, at 24, col. 6.
347. Apple, Humphrey Bars a CampaignNow, Doubts a Draft, N.Y. Times, Apr.
30, 1976, at 1, col. 8.
348. 1976 FEC REPoRT, supra note 42, at 74.
349. Id.

350. Id.
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aggregate limit, the candidate is the ultimate loser since he is
deprived of an important resource. Moreover, it establishes a
dangerous principle. If the contributions made to draft committees can be attributed to a candidate, then it would seem
to follow that other unauthorized independent activities could
similarly be laid at the candidate's doorstep. This could make
it exceedingly difficult for a candidate to benefit from efforts
made on his behalf which are imputed to him. One of the
principal reasons offered by Senator Humphrey for renouncing
his candidacy was his concern that he would be unable to
transform earlier independent activities on his behalf into a
coordinated organization. 351 The imposition of strict controls on

campaign activities by the Act and its amendments should be
balanced by the recognition of the candidate's right to exercise
tight control over those resources which remain available. The
Commission's proposal would establish a contrary principle.
The Role of PoliticalParties
A focal point of debate over the future of the political
system in this country has been the apparent weakening in
recent years of political parties.3 5 The 1972 presidential election continued this trend to the point where the respective
nominees of each major political party had built strong organizations essentially independent of the party structure.353 The
results for each were disastrous. On the one hand, the McGovern campaign's inability to broaden its base to other party
constituencies after the nomination strongly contributed to its
election day humiliation. On the other hand, the adventures of
the Committee to Re-elect the President require no elaboration151

Since the function of primaries is to select party nominees,
the party itself is obligated to remain neutral. Party activities
351. Apple, supra note 347. Independent efforts had been made to organize a
delegate slate in the New Jersey primary and to lay the groundwork for a Humphrey
campaign prior to his statement following the Pennsylvania primary. Nonetheless,
Humphrey stated that the "lack of campaign organization" in New Jersey concerned
him. Id.
352. See generally J. ABELS, supra note 255, at 74-94; D. ADAMANY & G. AGEE
supra note 7, at 204-07; D. BRODER, THE PARTY'S OVER (1972); Usher, Ohio: A Tale of
Two Parties,CAMPAIGN MONEY 252 (H. Alexander ed. 1976).
353. See F. MOSHER, WATERGATE: IMPLICATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 98
(1974); R. QYNN, WATERGATE AND THE AMERICAN PoLiTIcAL PROCESS 93-94 (1975); D.
SAFFELL,

354.

supra note 7, at 193-96.
See T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF

THE PRESIDENT

1972 (1973).

68
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are normally limited during this period to voter registration
efforts and preparation for the quadrennial national convention. Two of the purposes of the 1974 Amendments were the
strengthening of the major political parties and preventing the
proliferation of splinter parties.355 The amendments offered direct support to political parties through subsidies to the national nominating conventions.35 6 The Act further sought to
355. SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, at 7-8. The Senate report observed:
All but fringe candidates would have an incentive to seek a major party
nomination, rather than run as a minor party candidate, so as to be
eligible for the full level of public assistance in the general election. The
bill would thereby have a cohesive effect, encouraging different factions
to compete and work out coalitions within the framework of a basic twoparty system ....
At the same time, minor parties with significant support are eligible
to receive a fair share of public assistance commensurate with their
proven political strength.
Id.
356. I.R.C. § 9008. "Major" parties, see text accompanying notes 59 & 60 supra,
are entitled to subsidies up to $2 million. "Minor" parties, see text accompanying notes
71 & 72 supra, are entitled to a proportionate payment depending on their performance
relative to major parties in the preceding election.
The direct public financing of nominating conventions enhances the perception
of party neutrality. Similarly, it frees substantial party resources for other activities.
See J. BIBBY & H. ALEXANDER, THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL CONVENTION FINANCES &
ARRANGEMENTS (1965). Ed Cubberly, assistant convention manager for the Democratic
National Committee in 1972, praised the convention subsidies as one of the greatest
benefits of the new law, since it freed the party from "unhealthy" influences in paying
for its convention. As he noted: "The kind of activities and compromises parties had
been forced into to fund their national conventions were one of the seamier undersides
of politics, and lifting this burden is an improvement for everyone." Interview with Ed
Cubberly, supra note 247.
Robert Moss, also a Democratic National Committee staff member in 1972, noted
that eliminating the need for convention fundraising would also free the party to
engage in more significant activity during the nominating period. While emphasizing
the importance of strict party neutrality in the pre-convention stages, Mr. Moss noted
that there were a tremendous number of support activities the party could undertake
during that period which were being duplicated by each campaign and not being done
as efficiently as would be possible with centralization. Interview with Robert Moss,
supra note 139.
Discussions with current staff members of the Democratic National Committee
indicate that this was, in fact, happening. In contrast to the almost singleminded
devotion to delegate selection and convention planning at that time in 1971, the party
engaged in a wider range of more intensive support activities in 1975-76. Ralph Gerson,
General Counsel to the Democratic National Committee, noted that the party had in
recent years initiated or expanded operations to assist campaigns in polling, research,
voter identification, voter registration and other essential campaign support services.
Moreover, he felt that there was an "unstated assumption" that the party would be
active in assisting campaigns, particularly at the lower levels, in complying with the
dictates of the new law itself. Moreover, Mr. Gerson added, the party had expanded
its operations in programs to increase involvement of minority racial groups, media
assistance, and other programs that campaigns have in the past duplicated. Interview
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enhance the role of political parties by permitting candidates
in the general election to receive "substantial private funding,
in addition to the public grant, in the form of expenditures by
state and national party committees."' ' 57 Political parties are
permitted to spend on behalf of their presidential nominees in
the general election a sum equal to two cents multiplied by the
358
voting age population (VAP) of the United States. In 1976,
each major party was able to spend $3.2 million in addition to
the $21.8 million subsidy given directly to the candidate's principal campaign committee.3 5 Further, the Act permits each
party to spend in each United States senatorial race the greater
00
of $20,000 or two cents multiplied38 by the VAP of the state,
and up to $10,000 in House races.
The Act's opponents contended that these spending provisions unfairly prejudiced the efforts of minor parties and independent candidates, forcing them to compete with a publicly
subsidized two-party system. The potential for the new law to
favor unduly the major parties and their candidates was considered by the Court in Buckley. The Court concluded that it
was not clear that such assistance would necessarily disadvantage minor parties. The Court did note, however, that the problem was "troubling" and possibly left the door open to further
with Ralph Gerson, General Counsel to the Democratic National Committee, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 23, 1975).
357. SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, at 7-8. Presidential candidates receiving
federal subsidies are prohibited from receiving private contributions in the general
election. I.R.C. § 9003(b)(2).
358. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, § 112(2), 2 U.S.C.A.
§ 441a(d)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1977). The voting age population was to be determined pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 441a(e). The constitutionality of this expenditure
limit on political parties remains unclear after Buckley. See Clagett & Bolton, supra
note 88, at 1357-58.
359. Weaver, Parties Still Face Financing Trouble-SubsidiesUnder New Campaign Law are Not Ending TraditionalProblems of Fund-Raising, N.Y. Times, Sept.
12, 1976, at 29, col. 1.
An amendment to the Campaign Act recently proposed by Congressman Frank
Thompson, Jr. (D-N.J.), chairman of the House Administration Committee, would
exempt from limitation the payment by political parties of the costs of materials used
in connection with volunteer activities on behalf of a candidate. This exemption would
not include the costs of broadcasting, newspaper, or magazine advertisements if the
funds were earmarked for a specific candidate. CAMPAJGN PRAcs. REPs., Nov. 28, 1977,
at 3.
360. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, § 112(2),2 U.S.C. §
441a(d)(3)(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
361. Id. § 441a(d)(3)(B). The limits on party expenditures in congressional races
in states entitled to only one representative in Congress are the same as those in Senate
races. Id. § 441a(d)(3)(A).
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challenges based on future performance of the law.36 Nonetheless, the Court stated clearly that:
[T]he Constitution does not require Congress to treat all
declared candidates the same for public financing purposes . . . .Third parties have been completely incapable
of matching the major parties' ability to raise money and
win elections. Congress was, of course, aware of this fact
of American life, and thus was justified in providing both
major parties full funding and all other parties only a percentage of the major-party entitlement. Identical treatment of all parties, on the other hand, would not only make
it easy to raid the United States Treasury, it "would also
artificially foster the proliferation of splinter parties
. . .." The Constitution does not require the Government
to "finance the efforts of every nascent political group." '
The 1976 election demonstrated the benefits of the new
law to the major political parties. The parties became the natural object of the munificience of erstwhile large private contributors who found their activities limited by the new law. The
parties each were able to raise a total of $10.5 million to spend
in support of federal candidates. Moreover, while campaign
committees were limited to receipt of contributions of $1000
from individuals and $5000 from political committees (and
presidential candidates were barred from receiving any private
contributions in the general election), individual contributors
were able to give up to $20,000 each to political parties" 4 and
multicandidate committees were authorized to give up to
$15,000.111
The new law may inadvertently disadvantage political
parties in at least one way. Since political parties are able to
receive larger contributions than a candidate's principal campaign committee, a candidate would limit the party to receipt
of $5000 from all persons by designating the party as his princi362. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68-72 (1976).
363. Id. at 97-98. But see Fleishman, supra note 37, at 896-97.
364. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, § 112(2), 2 U.S.C.A.
§ 441a(a)(1)(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1977). Individuals are still limited, however, to
$25,000 in aggregate contributions.
365. Id. § 441a(a)(2)(B). Despite the obvious advantages of a well-financed party
under the new law, however, the Democratic National Committee has been permitted
to fall into serious debt. Curiously, this has occurred despite control by its members
of a majority of federal elective offices, including the White House. The Republican
National Committee, on the other hand, has accumulated large cash reserves since
1976.

1978]

CAMPAIGN ACT

pal campaign committee. This has the potentially adverse effect of preventing a candidate from centralizing his campaign
under one organization. A consolidation of this sort might be
desirable given the limitations on money available in the general election. The Commission has pointed out this anomaly
and recommended to Congress that it be remedied."'
CONCLUSION

The Campaign Act was an important step toward regulation of an area which had effectively been left ungoverned. The
Act sought to restore the diminished public confidence in the
political process by proscribing those practices which had been
revealed as sources of corruption. This is a natural result where
needed legislation results only after a scandal has occurred. In
this regard, the Act accomplished its purpose by placing limitations on excessively high contributions and expenditures,
requiring disclosure and reporting of campaign financing and
establishing a federal administrative agency equipped to enforce it.
The 1976 primaries confirmed that the reforms embodied
in the Campaign Act were effective remedies for the abuses
that led to their enactment. Remedying abuses, however, is
only the first step. Congress must now adopt a more expansive
view and reconsider the managerial aspects of operating under
the new law in light of the 1976 experience. Thus, for example,
the focus should not only be on whether contributions of more
than $1000 corrupt the political process, but also whether a
candidate can effectively plan a series of primary campaigns
that span five months while dependent on the aggregate sum
that can be raised under that contribution limit. Similarly,
Congress should consider whether the adjustments in resource
allocation occasioned by the new Act permit effective campaign planning without corresponding regulation of the time
and geographic framework over which they are to be expended.
In other words, campaign reform should now be directed towards the establishment of a more comprehensive system that
allows effective planning by removing or minimizing the influence of factors extrinsic to the relative merits of the candidates
and issues. Where this principle is not served, restrictions
should be removed as unnecessarily inhibiting the free flow of
political activity.
366.

1976 FEC REPoRT, supra note 42, at 72.
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When any major change is made in a system that has
operated with virtual impunity for a long period of time, it is
inevitable that difficulties will arise that will leave the new
system vulnerable to attack by its critics. The 1976 experience
demonstrated that financing and regulation of political campaigns is workable and efficacious. The task now is to refine the
new system to relax or remove those aspects of the law that
may have unnecessarily restricted political activity and tighten
those areas susceptible to evasion, while taking cognizance of
the principle that the result must be a process through which
candidates and their managers can wage effective campaigns.
It is this final element that often is lost in the battle for reform.
Thus, future amendment of the Campaign Act does not necessarily entail more restrictive regulation; rather its goal should
be adjusting, the system of regulation to more smoothly fit the
realities of campaign management.

